

FILE DESCRIPTION

BUREAU FILE

SUBJECT JULIUS ROBERT OPPENHEIMER

FILE NO. 100-17828

SECTION NO. 1-SUB A

SERIALS 1

THROUGH

85

NOTICE

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File No: 100-17828

Re: ^{Julius}
J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER

Date: 2-78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
1	9-17-46	NEWSPAPER CLIPPING NY TIMES	1	0	Outside the Rosenberg Case
2	8-16-46	DAILY MIRROR News. clip	1	0	Outside the Rosenberg Case
3	11-8-46	WASHINGTON POST News. clip	2	0	Outside the Rosenberg Case
4	5-6-47	N.Y. TIMES News clip.	1	0	" " "
5	11-6-47	N.Y. TIMES News clip	1	0	" "
6	12-12-47	WASH. SUNDAY STAR (3 News. clip. enc)	5	0	" "
7	11-15-48	NY TIMES News clip	1	0	" "
8	3-18-47	HERALD TRIBUNE News clip.	1	0	" "
9	3-11-49	N.Y. Times News. clip.	1	0	" "
10	1-26-50	L.A. TIMES News clips.	3	0	" "
11	5-10-50	WASH. POST News clips	2	0	" "
12	5-10-50	WASH. STAR News clip	1	0	" "

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Re: Julius Robert Oppenheimer

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(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
13	5-11-50	WASH POST news clip	1	0	Outside the Rosenberg Case
14	5-11-50	WASH. STAR news clip	1	0	
15	5-11-50	N.Y. TIMES news clip	1	0	" "
16	5-11-50	TIMES HERALD & STAR ED. news clip	1	0	" "
17	9-22-50	WASH POST news clip	1	0	" "
18	12-3-51	TIMES-HERALD news clip	1	0	" "
19	6-3-53	DAILY WORKER news clip	1	0	" "
20	6-19-53	WASH POST news clip	1	0	" "
21	6-19-53	NY TIMES news clip	1	0	" "
22	6-19-53	WASH STAR news clip	1	0	" "
23	6-20-53	WASH STAR news clip	1	0	" "
24	6-30-53	1 XEROX COPY - NAME OF PAPER UNRECOVERABLE news clip	1	0	" "

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Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
<u>25</u>	<u>10-15-53</u>	<u>WASH NEWS</u> <u>NEWS CLIP</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>Outside the Rosenberg Case</u>
<u>26</u>	<u>8-21-53</u>	<u>WASH NEWS</u> <u>NEWS CLIP</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	
<u>27</u>	<u>10-2-54</u>	<u>WASH. STAR</u> <u>NEWS CLIPS</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>" "</u>
<u>28</u>	<u>3-13-54</u>	<u>WASH. DAILY NEWS</u> <u>NEWS CLIPS</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>" "</u>
<u>29</u>	<u>3-15-54</u>	<u>WASH. DAILY NEWS</u> <u>NEWS CLIP</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>" "</u>
<u>30</u>	<u>8-12-54</u>	<u>WASH. CITY NEWS SERVICE</u> <u>NEWS CLIP</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>" "</u>
<u>31</u>	<u>8-12-54</u>	<u>WASH. CITY NEWS SERVICE</u> <u>NEWS CLIP</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>" "</u>
<u>32</u>	<u>8-12-54</u>	<u>WASH CITY NEWS SERVICE</u> <u>NEWS CLIP</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>" "</u>
<u>33</u>	<u>8-12-54</u>	<u>WASH CITY NEWS SERVICE</u> <u>NEWS CLIP</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>" "</u>
<u>34</u>	<u>8-12-54</u>	<u>"</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>" "</u>
<u>35</u>	<u>8-12-54</u>	<u>"</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>" "</u>
<u>36</u>	<u>4-27-54</u>	<u>"</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>" "</u>

File No: 100-17828

Re: JULIUS ROBERT OPPENHEIMER

Date: 2-78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
37	8-12-54	WASH. CITY NEWS SERVICE NEWS CLIP	1	0	Outside the Rosenberg Case
38	8-12-54	"	1	0	" "
39	4-8-54	N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE NEWS CLIPS	3	0	" "
40	8-12-54	WASH. CITY NEWS SERVICE NEWS CLIP	1	0	" "
41	4-9-54	N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE NEWS CLIP	2	0	" "
42	4-9-54	WASH POST NEWS CLIP	1	0	" "
43	4-10-54	N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE NEWS CLIP	1	0	" "
44	4-11-54	WASH POST NEWS CLIP	1	0	" "
45	4-11-54	WASH CITY NEWS SERVICE NEWS CLIP	5	0	" "
46	4-13-54	TIMES-HERALD NEWS CLIP	2	0	" "
47	8-10-54	WASH CITY NEWS SERVICE NEWS CLIP	1	0	" "
48	8-10-54	"	1	0	" "

File No: 100-17828Re: JULIUS ROBERT OPPENHEIMERDate: 2-78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
49	8-10-54	WASH. CITY NEWS SERVICE NEWS CLIP	1	0	Outside the Rosenberg Case
50	8-10-54	"	1	0	" "
51	8-10-54	"	1	0	" "
52	4-13-54	BOSTON RECORD NEWS CLIPS.	2	0	" "
53	4-13-54	DENVER POST NEWS CLIP	1	0	" "
54	4-13-54	N.Y. POST NEWS CLIPS	1	0	" "
55	4-13-54	N.Y. BROOKLYN EAGLE NEWS CLIP.	1	0	" "
56	4-13-54	N.Y. POST. NEWS CLIP.	2	0	" "
57	4-13-54	NEWARK STAR LEDGER NEWS CLIP	1	0	" "
58	4-13-54	NEWARK EVENING NEWS NEWS CLIP	1	0	" "
59	4-13-54	N.Y. WORLD TELEGRAM & SUN NEWS CLIP	1	1	
60	4-13-54	NY JOURNAL AMERICAN NEWS CLIP	2	0	OUTSIDE THE ROSENBERG CASE

15 1

File No: 100-17424Re: JULIUS ROBERT OPPENHEIMERDate: 2-74
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
61	4-13-54	N.Y. JOURNAL AMERICAN NEWSPAPER CLIPPING	1	0	Outside the Rosenberg Case
62	4-13-54	WASH NEWS NEWSPAPERS	2	0	" "
63	4-13-54	N.Y. JOURNAL AMERICAN NEWS CLIPS.	2	0	" "
64	8-10-54	WASH CITY NEWS SERVICE NEWS CLIPS.	1	0	" "
65	8-10-54	"	4	0	" "
66	8-10-54	"	1	0	" "
67	8-10-54	"	1	0	" "
68	8-10-54	"	1	0	" "
69	8-10-54	"	1	0	" "
70	8-10-54	"	1	0	" "
71	8-10-54	"	1	0	" "
72	4-13-54	WASH STAR NEWSPAPERS	3	0	" "

File No: 100-17828Re: JULIUS ROBERT ROSENBERGDate: 2-78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
73	4-13-54	WASH STAR NEWSPAPER CLIPPING	3	0	Outside the Rosenberg Case
74	8-10-54	WASH CITY NEWS SERVICE NEWS CLIPS	4	0	" " " "
75	8-10-54	WASH CITY NEWS SERVICE NEWS CLIP	1	0	" " " "
76	8-10-54	"	1	0	" " " "
77	8-10-54	"	1	0	" " " "
78	8-10-54	"	1	0	" " " "
79	4-13-54	WASH STAR NEWS CLIPS	2	0	" " " "
80	8-10-54	WASH CITY NEWS SERVICE NEWS CLIP	1	0	" " " "
81	8-10-54	"	1	0	" " " "
82	8-10-54	"	2	0	" " " "
83	4-13-54	WASH STAR NEWS CLIPS	16	0	" " " "
84	4-13-54	NY HERALD TRIBUNE NEWS CLIPS	3	0	" " " "

REVIEWED BY Ann / 22P

File No: 100 - 17128

Re: JULIUS ROBERT OPPENHEIMER

Date: 2-78
(month/year)

[illegible]


U. S. Department of Justice

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FEDERAL BUREAU

of

INVESTIGATION



USE CARE IN HANDLING THIS FILE

Transfer-Call 421

100
17828 SUB A
SECTION 1
JUNE 27 1946-APR. 13. 1954

Tolson _____
 Boardman _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
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 Glavin _____
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 Tracy _____
 Egan _____
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 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Rm. _____
 Mr. Holloman _____
 Miss Gandy _____

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Scientists Long Feuding Over Rival Atomic Plans

By **ALLAN KELLER**,
 Staff Writer.

From the first day that pure science was harnessed to American production techniques, producing the atom bomb, there has been a deep and bitter struggle between scientists engaged in developing nuclear weapons.

First of all there was some half-hearted opposition to any building of the atom bomb by some scientists on the purely moral ground that it was too horrible a weapon to use.

Germans Trying.

This unwillingness to use pure science for the art of war was overcome, this writer learned in talks with many scientists and military men, when the intelligence services of Great Britain and this country found incontrovertible evidence that German laboratories were speeding research to produce atomic bombs.

The Germans, to avoid damage by Allied bombers, used a Norwegian plant to develop heavy water, one of the basic steps in preparing for atomic warfare. Britain sent heavy bombers, at great cost in planes and men, to blast the laboratory in its hidden valley. It was one of the most crucial victories of the war,

Then the scene of the scientific conflict shifted to this country. As the war drew on toward conclusion in 1945, Dr. Edward Teller, a physicist born in Hungary, working at the Los Alamos laboratory in New Mexico, worked out the theoretical process that would make possible the building of a hydrogen bomb—a thousand-fold more powerful than the atom bomb.

As he worked out his mathematical and scientific problems the Atomic Energy Commission decided that the United States was so far ahead of any other nation's capacity to build A-bombs, that it decided to coast along, even though history has shown this was false security.

Russian Blast.

Then the Russians exploded their first fission bombs somewhere in the sandy wastes of Sinkiang or Uzbekistan. Devices we had perfected revealed the increase in atmospheric radiation, and our scientists told our military leaders that we were no longer undisputed master of the atom bomb.

At once the old schism within the ranks of the scientists which had arisen over the A-bomb became more marked when Dr.

Teller showed we could move on to the hydrogen bomb. There was a similar disagreement among politicians and military men.

Thought Chance Slim.

Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, scientific head of the atom-bomb project, opposed the jump to the H-bomb. David Lillenthal, who had been chairman of the AEC, backed Dr. Oppenheimer.

The scientist, who today is faced with a hearing on the question of his fitness to have access to restricted information, expressed the belief that the chance of building a hydrogen bomb was only a 50-50 gamble.

Dr. Oppenheimer expressed the conviction that the H-bomb was beyond the resources of the Russian scientists. Dr. James Conant, president of Harvard, was a strong supporter of the Oppenheimer thesis.

Then from the barren heartland of central Asia came indisputable evidence that the Reds had produced a hydrogen-type explosion. It was evident to most persons that Dr. Klaus Fuchs had dumped virtually all of our secrets into the laps of the leaders in the Kremlin.

Fuchs, the traitor, had attended

under special carte blanche from British authorities, seminars at Los Alamos at which the Teller theories had been discussed.

Rear Adm. Lewis Strauss, president head of the AEC, urged President Truman to start building the H-bomb at once. Mr. Truman ordered an immediate, intensive start.

But the feeling at Los Alamos was so cool to the H-bomb that even after the go-ahead order was given sand was thrown in the bearings of the new H-bomb project.

The matter was resolved by bypassing Los Alamos. A new laboratory was established at Livermore, Calif., staffed largely by University of California scientists, and the work was put on a "don't-spare-the-horses" basis.

For two years, this writer has been told, the United States teetered on the brink of disaster. It was ahead in the field of atom bombs, but many scientists were convinced it was lagging behind Russia with the H-bomb.

Had Russia chosen to start war during those two years, our power to retaliate would have been much weaker than it is today. The American capacity to build in a hurry wiped out the disparity.

100-17828-A-59

NOT RECORDED

145 AUG 11 1954

Handwritten signature: J. Edgar Hoover

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RECEIVED
 AUG 12 1954

FILE DESCRIPTION

BUREAU FILE

J. ROBERT
SUBJECT OPPENHEIMER

FILE NO. 100 - 178 281

SECTION NO. 2

SERIALS 1

thru

54

File No

100-17828 SUBA

Re: OPPENHEIMER

Date

2/78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
1	APRIL 14, 1954	SUB A NEWS ARTICLE WCNS	811	-	outside the "R" Case
2	"	" "	1	1	" "
3	"	" "	1	-	outside the "R" Case
4	"	" "	1	-	" " " "
5	"	WASH. NEWS	1	-	" " " "
6	"	WAS. POST.	1	-	" " " "
7	"	WAS. STAR	1	-	" " " "
8	"	WAS. POST.	3	-	" " " "
9	"	WAS. POST.	1	-	" " " "
10	"	WAS. STAR	4	-	" " " "
11	"	WAS. POST	1	-	" " " "
12	"	WAS. POST	3	-	" " " "

File No

100-17828A

Re

OPPENHEIMER

Date

2/78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
13	4/14/54	SUB A. NEWS ARTICLE WAS. POST	1	-	Outside the "R" Case
14	"	WAS. STAR	2	-	" " " "
15	"	N.Y. TIMES	1	-	" " " "
16	"	PHILA. INQ.	1	-	" " " "
17	"	WAS. NEWS	2	-	" " " "
18	"	N.Y. BROOK. EAGLE	2	-	" " " "
19	"	NK STAR LEDGER	1	-	" " " "
20	"	N.Y. JOUR. AM.	1	-	" " " "
21	"	N.Y. POST.	1	-	" " " "
22	"	N.Y. BROOK. EAGLE	2	-	" " " "
23	"	N.Y. MIRROR	3	-	" " " "
24	4/13/54	SF NEWS	1	-	" " " "

File No

100-178288

Re

OPPENHEIM GR

Date

2/78

(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
25	4/14/54	SUB. A. NEWS ARTICLE WAS. STAR	1	-	outside the "R" Case
26	"	NY Mirror	2	-	" " " "
27	"	N.Y. HER. TRIB.	2	-	" " " "
28	"	DAILY WORKER	2	-	" " " "
29	"	WAS. NEWS	1	-	" " " "
30	"	WAS. STAR,	1	-	" " " "
31	"	N.Y. JOU. AM.	6	-	" " " "
32	"	LONDON DAILY TEL.	2	-	" " " "
33	"	WAS. NEWS	1	-	" " " "
34	"	WAS. STAR	1	-	" " " "
35	"	N.Y. HER. TRIB.	1	-	" " " "
36	"	N.Y. HER. TRIB.	1	-	" " " "

File No

100-17828 A

Re

OPPENHEIMER

Date

2/78

(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
37	4/14/54	SUB A NEWS ARTICLE N.Y. HER., TRIB,	3	-	Outside the "R" Case
38	"	WAS., NEWS	1	-	" " " "
39	"	WAS., STAR,	1	-	" " " "
40	"	WAS., STAR,	1	-	" " " "
41	"	N.Y. NEWS	2	-	" " " "
42	"	LONDON DAILY MAIL	1	-	" " " "
43	"	WAS., POST.	1	-	" " " "
44	"	N.Y. HER., TRIB,	2	-	" " " "
45	"	ST. LOUIS. GLOB & DEM,	1	-	" " " "
46	"	TRENT. EVE. NEWS,	1	-	" " " "
47	"	PA. DAILY NEWS,	1	-	" " " "
48	"	N.Y. HER., TRIB	2	-	" " " "

Re: OPPGNHGIMSD

Date: 2/75
(month/year)

PLATE


U. S. Department of Justice

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FEDERAL BUREAU

of

INVESTIGATION



USE CARE IN HANDLING THIS FILE

Transfer-Call 421

100
17828
SUB A

SECTION 2
APRIL 14, 1954 ONLY

0-20
Mr. Tolson ✓
Mr. Boardman ✓
Mr. Nichols ✓
Mr. Belmont ✓
Mr. Glavin ✓
Mr. Harbo ✓
Mr. Rosen ✓
Mr. Tamm ✓
Mr. Tracy ✓
Mr. Mohr ✓
Mr. Winterrowd ✓
Tele. Room ✓
Mr. Holloman ✓
Miss Gandy ✓

BZ/AN

(FBI REPORT)

A 1945 FBI REPORT ON SOVIET ESPIONAGE IN THIS COUNTRY TOLD HOW SUSPENDED ATOMIC SCIENTIST J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER DENOUNCED AS "TREASON AGAINST THE UNITED STATES" CERTAIN EFFORTS TO OBTAIN ATOMIC INFORMATION FROM HIM.

THE REPORT WAS THE SAME ONE WHICH CONTAINED CHARGES BY ELIZABETH BENTLEY, ADMITTED FORMER COMMUNIST COURIER, AGAINST THE LATE HARRY DEXTER WHITE AND OTHERS SHE CLAIMED SUPPLIED INFORMATION TO HER WARTIME COMMUNIST SPY RING.

DETAILS WERE GIVEN BY THE HOUSE UNAMERICAN ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE IN A REPORT ON COMMUNISM IN 1951.

THE COMMITTEE'S ACCOUNT OF THE FBI REPORT SAID THE INCIDENT INVOLVING OPPENHEIMER STEMMED FROM A 1942 MEETING BETWEEN PETER IVANOV, VICE CONSUL OF THE SOVIET CONSULATE IN SAN FRANCISCO, AND ONE GEORGE CHARLES ELTENTON.

IT GAVE THIS ACCOUNT:

AT THE MEETING, IVANOV ASKED ELTENTON TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ON ATOMIC EXPERIMENTS BEING CARRIED ON AT THE RADIATION LABORATORIES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.

ELTENTON THEN APPROACHED HAAKON CHEVALIER, PROFESSOR OF ROMANCE LANGUAGES AT THE UNIVERSITY AND REQUESTED HIM TO ASSIST IN OBTAINING THE DESIRED INFORMATION.

"ELTENTON EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD A DIRECT CONTACT WITH AN OFFICIAL OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND THAT THIS OFFICIAL HAD EXPLAINED THAT SINCE RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES ARE ALLIES, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS ENTITLED TO ANY TECHNICAL DATA THAT MIGHT BE OF ASSISTANCE TO THAT COUNTRY.

"CHEVALIER, FOLLOWING THIS APPROACH TO ELTENTON, CONTACTED J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER, THE DIRECTOR OF THE ATOMIC BOMB PROJECT AND TOLD HIM OF THE CONVERSATION HE HAD WITH ELTENTON.

"OPPENHEIMER TOLD CHEVALIER THAT HE CONSIDERED SUCH ACTS OR SUCH ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ON THIS PROJECT AS CONSTITUTING TREASON AGAINST THE UNITED STATES."

4/14--MJ614P

100-17828- A2
NOT RECORDED
145 AUG 10 1954

McMahon
400

WASHINGTON CITY NEWS SERVICE

FILE DESCRIPTION

BUREAU FILE

SUBJECT J. Robert Oppenheimer

FILE NO. 100-17828 - Sub A

SECTION NO. 3

SERIALS 1

thru

70

File No: 100-17828 SUB ARe: Dr. J. Robert OPPENHEIMERDate: 2-78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
1	4-15-54	News Clipping NY Times	2	0	outside the R case
2	4-15-54	" " NY Journal American	2	0	outside the R case
3	4-15-54	" " Chicago American	1	0	outside the R case
4	4-15-54	" " Chicago Daily News	1	0	outside the R case
5	4-15-54	" " NY Post	1	0	outside the R case
6	4-15-54	" " Washington Star	1	0	outside the R case
7	4-15-54	" " " News	1	0	outside the R case
8	4-15-54	" " " Star	2	0	outside the R case
9	4-15-54	" " Wash. Post & Times Herald	1	0	outside the R case
10	4-15-54	" " NY Herald Tribune	2	2	
11	4-15-54	" " Wash. Post & Times Herald	1	0	outside the R case
12	4-15-54	" " Washington Star	1	1	

File No: 100-17828 sub-ARe: Dr. J. Robert OppenheimerDate: 2-78
(month/year)

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			Actual	Released	
13	4.15.54	News Clipping NY Herald Tribune	1	0	outside the R case
14	4.15.54	" " NY mirror	1	0	outside the R case
15	4.15.54	" " Washington Post & Times Herald	1	0	outside the R case
16	4.15.54	" " Daily Worker	1	0	outside the R case
17	8.10.54	" " Wash. City News Service	1	0	outside the R case
18	8.10.54	" " " " " "	1	0	outside the R case
19	8.10.54	" " " " " "	1	0	outside the R case
20	8.10.54	" " " " " "	1	0	outside the R case
21	8.10.54	" " " " " "	1	0	outside the R case
22	8.10.54	" " " " " "	1	0	outside the R case
23	4.15.54	" " Wash Post & Times Herald	1	0	outside the R case
24	4.15.54	" " NY Herald Tribune	2	0	outside the R case

File No: 100-17828-sub DRe: Dr. J. Robert OppenheimerDate: 2-78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
25	4.15.54	News Clipping Omaha World-Herald	1	0	outside the R case
26	4.15.54	" " Chicago American	1	0	outside the R case
27	4.15.54	" " PH Inquirer	1	0	outside the R case
28	4.15.54	" " CG Tribune	1	0	outside the R case
29	4.15.54	" " " Daily News	2	0	outside the R case
30	4.15.54	" " The Evening News	1	0	outside the R case
31	4.15.54	" " Wash Star	1	0	outside the R case
32	4.15.54	" " " "	2	0	outside the R case
33	4.15.54	" " Salt Lake Tribune	1	0	outside the R case
34	4.16.54	" " Wash. News Service	1	0	outside the R case
35	4.16.54	" " NY Mirror	2	0	outside the R case
36	4.16.54	" " NY Herald Tribune	2	0	outside the R case

File No: 100-17828-Sub A Re: Dr. J Robert OppenheimerDate: 2-78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
37	4-16-54	News Clipping WASH Star	2	0	outside the R case
38	4-16-54	" " C.G. Daily News	2	0	outside the R case
39	4-16-54	" " WASH. City News Service	1	0	outside the R case
40	4-16-54	" " " " " "	1	0	outside the R case
41	4-16-54	" " NY Times	3	0	outside the R case
42	4-16-54	" " WASH Post	2	0	outside the R case
43	4-16-54	" " " Star	1	0	outside the R case
44	4-16-54	" " WASH Post & Times Herald	1	0	outside the R case
45	4-16-54	" " " " " "	1	0	outside the R case
46	4-16-54	" " " News	1	0	outside the R case
47	4-16-54	" " NY Mirror	3	0	outside the R case
48	4-16-54	" " " " " "	2	0	outside the R case

File No: 100-77828 Sub ARe: Dr. J. Robert OppenheimerDate: 2-78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
49	4-16-54	News Clipping Wash Post, Times Herald	1	0	outside the R case
50	4-16-54	" " " " " "	1	0	outside the R case
51	4-16-54	" " NY Herald Tribune	2	0	outside the R case
52	4-16-54	" " Wash. Post, Times Herald	1	0	outside the R case
53	4-16-54	" " NY Herald Tribune	2	0	outside the R case
54	4-16-54	" " CG Tribune	1	0	outside the R case
55	4-16-54	" " Wash Post, Times Herald	2	0	outside the R case
56	4-16-54	" " Wash. Star	2	0	outside the R case
57	4-16-54	" " BS. Globe	1	0	outside the R case
58	4-16-54	" " NY Post	1	0	outside the R case
59	4-16-54	" " NY Mirror	2	2	
60	4-17-54	" " " "	1	0	outside the R case


File No: 100-17828 sub ARe: Dr. J. Robert OppenheimerDate: 2-78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
61	4-17-54	News Clipping Wash Post + Herald	1	0	outside the R case
62	4-17-54	" " NY Herald Tribune	2	0	outside the R case
63	4-17-54	" " Wash Post + Times Herald	1	1	
64	4-17-54	" " NY Journal American	1	1	
65	4-17-54	" " BS Post	1	0	outside the R case
66	4-17-54	" " NY World Telegram + Sun	1	0	outside the R case
67	4-17-54	" " Wash Star	1	0	outside the R case
68	4-17-54	" " Daily Worker	1	0	outside the R case
69	4-17-54	" " Wash City News Service	1	0	outside the R case
70	4-17-54	" " " " " "	1	0	outside the R case

U. S. Department of Justice

(MATERIAL MUST NOT BE REMOVED FROM OR ADDED TO THIS FILE)

FEDERAL BUREAU
of
INVESTIGATION



See also Nos. _____

100-17827-506 A
SECTION 3
APR. 15, 1954 - APR. 15, 1954

Today in Washington

Adverse Decision Predicted On Oppenheimer Clearance

By DAVID LAWRENCE

WASHINGTON, April 14.—The sensation of the hour here continues to be the decision of the President and the Atomic Energy Commission to suspend the clearance of J. Robert Oppenheimer to be a science adviser to the government.

When the Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, said at his news conference that, while he has "the greatest sympathy for any one who made a mistake and has reformed," he thought "they ought to be reformed somewhere else than in the military services," it was taken by many reporters present to mean that he had reference to Dr. Oppenheimer. The noted scientist has admitted his earlier associations with Communist causes and has acknowledged his mistakes.

Dr. Oppenheimer was a consultant to the Defense Department's Research and Development Board, and Secretary Wilson says the whole board was dropped and that this "was a smooth way of cutting that as far as the Defense Department was concerned."

Adverse Decision Due

The general trend of speculation here is that the special board, which will report in the next two weeks, is about to declare that, because of the charges made against him, Dr. Oppenheimer ought not continue as a government counselor in any capacity on bomb projects.

This may explain in part the sudden publicity about the case. "The New York Times" on Tuesday morning was one of the few papers that explained the circumstances under which the Oppenheimer controversy was launched in the press this week.

"The Times" said:

"In view of the fact that 'The Times' was in possession of most of the facts in the case, Dr. Oppenheimer made the statement of charges and his reply available to 'The Times' so that the record of the case could be written from the actual documents."

The Atomic Energy Commission in its statement immediately afterward recognized that Dr. Oppenheimer had made public the documents in the case. It said, however, it was his privilege to do so. This correspondent reported yesterday that it was being assumed generally that the publicity was due to a desire to head off an attack by Senator McCarthy. But it turns out now that the purpose or motivation by those on the Oppenheimer side was to endeavor to win support in the court of public opinion and influence, if possible, the judgment soon to be issued by the special three-man board. Undoubtedly reports had reached the Oppenheimer side that the board might soon render an unfavorable judgment and that it might come in a few

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Times-Herald _____
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N.Y. Herald Tribune _____
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Date: APR 15 1954

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days. Hence, it is conceivable that the publicity was really designed to reverse the trend of official thinking.

There is reason to believe that the case has already been heard, the facts assembled and the criteria established in other cases which would make it doubtful if Dr. Oppenheimer would be permitted hereafter to be an adviser to the government and to have access to secret scientific data.

This is a tragic occurrence. Undoubtedly Dr. Oppenheimer is not the type of man who would stoop to espionage or to betrayal of his own country. But, on the other hand, government officials have had a good deal of worry about the way scientists feel generally on the matter of policies toward Soviet Russia. Thus, some of the same scientists who helped to build the atomic bomb because they wanted it thrown against Japan and so consummate the defeat of the Axis powers, later opposed the making of H-bombs for use against Soviet Russia or the Communist empire.

Disclosures Advocated

Another paradox is the advocacy by Dr. Oppenheimer and other scientists of a policy of more disclosures of atomic data, to other governments, the pressure for this upon the Washington government has been intense from all parts of the world, and particularly from European governments. The United States has been reluc-

tant, not because it wouldn't trust the civilian officials in those governments but because the data would become available to various scientists abroad whose concept of loyalty is often warped. Thus, Klaus Fuchs, who betrayed to Soviet Russia most of the secrets of the A-bomb and some data about the hydrogen bomb, was a British scientist who claims he wanted to prevent war. He wanted the Communists to have the bomb secret to offset America's possession of the same data.

A careful reading of the facts in the case of Dr. Oppenheimer will show that he offered advice on military strategy and public policy and became almost fanatical in the presentation of his views and in lining up others to his side. The government here, with the facts about Dr. Oppenheimer's past attitudes before it, has therefore the problem of ascertaining whether all the so-called "derogatory information," when examined in the light of the policies he advocated, makes him hereafter unsuitable as a member of science advisory boards here. The trend of the information available today is that the conclusion already reached would be unfavorable on security risk rather than loyalty grounds.

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David Lawrence

Dr. Oppenheimer and Security

Speculation Sees Probability of Physicist Being Barred From Working on Bomb Projects in the Future

The sensation of the hour here continues to be the decision of the President and the Atomic Energy Commission to suspend the clearance of J. Robert Oppenheimer to be a science adviser to the Government.

When the Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, said at his news conference that, while he has "the greatest sympathy for any one who made a mistake and has reformed," he thought "they ought to be reformed somewhere else than in the military services," it was taken by many reporters present to mean that he had reference to Dr. Oppenheimer. The noted scientist has admitted his earlier associations with Communist causes and has acknowledged his mistakes.

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Another paradox is the advocacy by Dr. Oppenheimer and other scientists of a policy of more disclosures of atomic data to other governments. The pressure for this upon the Washington Government has been intense from all parts of the world, and particularly from European governments. The United States has been reluctant, not because it wouldn't trust the civilian officials in those governments but because the data would

become available to various scientists abroad whose concept of loyalty is often warped. Thus, Klaus Fuchs, who betrayed to Soviet Russia most of the secrets of the A-bomb and some data about the hydrogen bomb, was a British scientist who claims he wanted to prevent war. He wanted the Communists to have the bomb secret to offset America's possession of the same data.

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191 AUG 12 1954

Times-Herald
Wash. Post
Wash. News
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Date: APR 1

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Who Should Investigate?

THE SECRET INVESTIGATION of J. Robert Oppenheimer will not satisfy the American people because it is secret. In a matter involving the lives of all of us, there should be no secrecy.

The national defense is in no way involved. The Russians have the hydrogen bomb and we are now being told that they had it ahead of us due to a conflict within our Government as to whether we should make a hydrogen bomb or not. Robert Oppenheimer was opposed to making the hydrogen bomb.

The Atomic Energy Commission has designated a panel to investigate Oppenheimer. While that panel is in secret session, Oppenheimer supplied two newspapers with his side of the story. The data provided by the FBI, which the Department of Justice gave to the President and which caused Oppenheimer to be suspended from all official duties and relationships, have not been made public, which it could not be under the law.

This raises the question as to whether a board appointed by the A.E.C. is the suitable body to make such an investigation. After all, the A.E.C. itself is on the spot. It had a report on the subject of Oppenheimer some time in 1947. In 1949, his brother, Frank Oppenheimer, also employed in atomic matters, was disclosed as a Communist Party member by the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Both Oppenheimers were married to Communists. Robert Oppenheimer gave employment to known and public Communists. What did the A.E.C. do about it? We are told that the question was raised several times and that each time Oppenheimer was cleared.

About a year ago, the McCarthy Committee of the Senate began to investigate Communist infiltration into the A.E.C. Its new chairman, Lewis Strauss, requested delay until he cleaned up any mess that existed, but Lewis Strauss was a member of the A.E.C. from 1946 to 1950 and he must have known about Oppenheimer, who was also subsequently associated with him at the Institute for Advanced Study.

THEREFORE what needs to be investigated is not J. Robert Oppenheimer alone but the A.E.C. It needs to be recalled that from 1942 to 1947, the FBI was excluded from all investigative or screening activities in connection with atomic fission. They were only called in after it was established that the atom bomb was stolen.

The Oppenheimer case is only one in this most secret agency of Government. Dr. Klaus Fuchs worked for it. Dr. Allan Nunn May worked for it. Dr. Raymond Boyer worked for it. These are convicted spies.



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191 AUG 11 1954

Times-Herald _____
Wash. Post _____
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Date: APR 16 1954

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Julius Rosenberg was able to invade it even most Americans never heard of the Manhattan Project at Los Alamos. He was able to establish a cell there. He was able to give his agents adequate cover so that they could steal what they wanted to steal. He was able to get what he wanted and to transmit it to Soviet Russia.

We do not know to this day who let Julius Rosenberg operate in Los Alamos. We do not know exactly how he managed to do his work there so effectively. We do not know how he duplicated that espionage job at Fort Monmouth. We have an inkling from the McCarthy Committee hearings but not the full story. That is what needs to be investigated thoroughly and in public. There is no longer any excuse for secrecy.

Only a congressional committee with adequate powers of subpoena can do this job. No agency of Government can investigate itself any more than a man can try himself for murder.

PRESIDENT TRUMAN ordered the production of the hydrogen bomb on January 31, 1950, a considerable period, AS WE NOW KNOW, after the Russians started on this work and long after the science of the bomb was known. On January 30, 1950, David Lilienthal still questioned the cost of the bomb and Representative Sterling Cole, now head of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee of the Congress said that President Truman snuffed "a chance to take the lead in halting the mad race of modern science toward more and greater weapons of destruction."

In a word, the differences of views continued after President Truman ordered the bomb made. There ought now to be a full dress investigation in public to determine exactly what the story is. Hundreds of witnesses need to be called so that not an iota of doubt exists in the minds of the American people.

We ought to know for sure whether the Government of the United States or the Kremlin decided the timing of our work on the bomb.

J. Robert Oppenheimer

These Days

The Oppenheimer Case

By George Sokolsky

IN HIS television reply to Edward R. Murrow, Sen. Joe McCarthy charged that research on the hydrogen



Sokolsky

(thermonuclear) bomb had been delayed 18 months. The response was immediate and it was generally unfavorable to McCarthy on the assumption that he was making a wild, baseless insinuation.

Rep. W. Sterling Cole, chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee of the Congress, immediately stepped into the breach and gave a forthright statement of the facts which established beyond doubt that there had been a delay. He, however, omitted any reference to Dr. Bruno Pontecorvo, the Italian scientist of British citizenship, one of the world's principal experts in this field, who deserted from our side and went over to the Russians. He has since been engaged in developing the hydrogen bomb for Soviet Russia.

Bruno Pontecorvo and a group of Italian scientists, Enrico Fermi, Edoardo Amaldi, Franco Rasetti and Emilio Segre, believed that they had invented some phases of all this work on atomic fission and thermonuclear fusion. They had been assisted financially by a Dutch company

and an Italian entrepreneur, G. N. Giannini of Pasadena, Calif. They offered to sell their product to the United States Government for \$10,000,000. This was a patent suit involving an Italian patent and an American patent granted in 1940.

THE ATOMIC Energy Commission at first rejected their demands but took the product of their work. They were unable to sue in the courts because everything about the matter was so very top secret that a trial would have been impossible. In 1953, the Atomic Energy Commission settled this issue for \$300,000.

It was too late so far as Bruno Pontecorvo was concerned. He had taken his wares and given them to the other side.

I add this item to the inquiry into the affairs of J. Robert Oppenheimer because it is time that every phase of this problem be studied.

The Atomic Energy Commission itself may or may not be a suitable agency to investigate and reach conclusions about Oppenheimer and the entire A.E.C. scandal, which includes the Klaus Fuchs and Julius Rosenberg espionage operations. If Oppenheimer is innocent, no justice will be done him by closed sessions and a white-wash; if he is guilty of misconduct, stupidity or malfeasance, the public ought to know. The A.E.C. investigation will sooner or later be followed by a Congressional Committee investigation.

THE STORY about J. Robert Oppenheimer and his brother, Frank, has been going the rounds since 1946, and the question of the relations of J. Robert Oppenheimer to Communist activities has been freely discussed.

In January, 1946, a committee was appointed by Secretary of State James Byrnes, headed by the then Under Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, to report on the international control of atomic energy. This committee appointed a board of consultants headed by David E. Lillenthal, then chairman of the TVA, and included among its members J. Robert Oppenheimer. This board of consultants prepared the Acheson-Lillenthal report, which Bernard M. Baruch found inadequate when he was appointed to deal with the matter.

It seems to me that the Oppenheimer case opens the way to a full investigation into all that happened in the matter of the development of atomic fission as a weapon of war, including the espionage efforts of the Russians, their use of Dr. Klaus Fuchs, Julius Rosenberg, etc., the rejection by some scientists of the American advantage of priority, the political activities of the scientists, etc. Men make mistakes and then in the hurly of wartime, they make serious mistakes. That is no crime if the motive was not treacherous. What is wrong is to keep the people in ignorance and doubt.

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The Washington Post
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Date: APR 17 1954

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Subversive Front:
'Worker'
Read at
Los Alamos

By HOWARD BUSHMORE

A ROUGH-AND-READY Army MP has some startling information regarding the type of literature read by our atomic scientists at Los Alamos while they were making the bomb that rocked the world.

This MP was assigned to guard the homes of the top scientists at Los Alamos and more than once he was startled to see the Daily Worker on the reading table of certain big domes in 1943-44.

He also reports that the wife of one noted scientist conducted a political Carrie Nation campaign to run all military personnel off the government reservation. According to the MP, she was one of the Daily Worker readers.

If the AEC—or any Congressional committee—is interested, this MP is available for questioning. He's not an intellectual and he isn't a victim of hysteria, but he is a patriot. His name can be obtained through this department.

"People of Dignity"

Speaking of hysteria, the Queens College student paper "The Crown"—bewails McCarthy's "witch-hunting" and states: "Constitutional rights are ignored, men are ruined in their professions, accusations are founded on dissension and disagreement, people of dignity are subject to debasement."

Apparently the editor doesn't include among the "people of dignity" the taxpayers who support the "Crown" and who paid the salaries of Queens College's Fifth Amendment professors.

That Rosenberg committee set up to defend the executed A-bomb spies is now attempting to get Morton Sobell, a co-conspirator in the case, removed from Alcatraz. They claim it's a rough and uncouth place, full of criminals.

Vets' Parade

The veteran's wing of the ADA known as the Americans Veterans Committee is staging a May Day rally of its own. But heaven forbid, it will not engage in vulgar anti-Communism. In a slap at the VFW's traditional Loyalty Day parade of the same date, the AVC thunders: "Some extremely indignant and chauvinistic 'professional veterans' have turned May Day into a pedestrian demonstration of anti-Communism." The AVC forgets the Loyalty Day parade is sponsored by vets with a 100 per cent record of having fought for the United States overseas. Of course, by ADA-AVC standards, that makes them "chauvinists."

Last year Medford Evans, for eight years an official with the Atomic Energy Commission, gave the McCarthy committee some explosive statements concerning lack of security in the A-bomb project. Evans' book, "The Secret War for the A-Bomb," provides material for a real AEC investigation.

On the required reading list this week is an article "An Anti-Communist's Guide to Action" in the May issue of the American Mercury. By the nation's top authority Dr. J. B. Matthews.

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J. Robert Apple

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N. Y. JOURNAL AMERICAN

DATED **APR 1 1954**

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FILE DESCRIPTION

BUREAU FILE

SUBJECT J. Robert
Oppenheimer

FILE NO. 100-17828 A

SECTION NO. 4

SERIALS A1

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A56

File No: 100-17828ARe: J. Robert OppenheimerDate: 2/78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
1	4/18/54	CLIPPING FROM THE WORKER	3	0	OUTSIDE The Rosenberg case
2	4/18/54	" WASH. CITY NEWS SERVICE	1	0	outside the Rosenberg case
3	4/18/54	" N.Y. TIMES	3	0	outside the Rosenberg case
4	4/18/54	" CT SUN-TIMES	2	0	outside the Rosenberg case
5	4/18/54	" WASH. STAR	7	7	outside the Rosenberg case
6	4/18/54	" NK SUNDAY NEWS	1	0	outside the Rosenberg case
7	4/18/54	" N.Y. TIMES	6	6	
8	4/18/54	" WASH. POST	2	0	outside the Rosenberg case
9	4/18/54	" WASH. NEWS SERVICE	1	0	outside the Rosenberg case
10	4/19/54	" N.Y. POST	1	0	outside the Rosenberg case
11	4/19/54	" WASH. NEWS	2	0	outside the Rosenberg case
12	4/19/54	" WASH. POST & TIMES HERALD	1	0	outside the Rosenberg case

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			Actual	Released	
13	4/19/54	CLIPPING FROM N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE	1	0	OUTSIDE THE ROSENBERG CASE
14	4/19/54	" WASH. NEWS	1	0	outside the Rosenberg Case
15	4/19/54	" N.Y. MIRROR	2	0	outside the Rosenberg Case
16	4/19/54	" WASH. POST & TIMES HERALD	1	0	outside the Rosenberg Case
17	4/19/54	" CT SUN-TIMES	1	0	outside the Rosenberg Case
18	4/19/53	" NEW LEADER	2	0	outside the Rosenberg Case
19	4/19/54	" DAILY WORKER	1	0	outside the Rosenberg Case
20	4/19/54	" WASH POST	1	0	outside the Rosenberg Case
21	4/19/54	" WASH. POST	1	0	outside the Rosenberg Case
22	4/15/54	" Escondido Daily Times-Advocate	1	0	outside the Rosenberg Case
23	4/19/54	" WASH STAR	1	0	outside the Rosenberg Case
24	4/15/54	" Denver Post	1	0	outside the Rosenberg Case

File No: 100-17828 ARe: J. Robert OppenheimerDate: 2/78
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			Actual	Released	
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26	4/19/54	" WASH. STAR	1	0	outside the Rosenberg Case
27	4/19/54	" WASH. STAR	1	0	outside the Rosenberg Case
28	4/20/54	" WASH POST & TIMES HERALD	2	0	outside the Rosenberg Case
29	4/20/54	" WASH. CITY NEWS SERVICE	1	1	outside the Rosenberg Case
30	4/20/54	" CI TRIBUNE	1	0	outside the Rosenberg Case
31	4/20/54	" CI TRIBUNE	1	0	outside the Rosenberg Case
32	4/20/54	" WASH POST & TIMES HERALD	2	2	outside the Rosenberg Case
33	4/20/54	" "	2	0	outside the Rosenberg Case
34	4/21/54	" WASH. CITY NEWS SERVICE	1	0	outside the Rosenberg Case
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File No: 100-17828ARe: J. Robert OppenheimerDate: 2/78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
49	4/24/54	CLIPPING FROM C.I. SUN-TIMES	1	0	OUTSIDE the Rosenberg Case
50	4/24/54	" NK EVENING NEWS	1	0	OUTSIDE the Rosenberg Case
51	4/25/54	" WASH. POST & TIMES HERALD	1	0	OUTSIDE the Rosenberg Case
52	4/25/54	" THE WORKER "	1	0	OUTSIDE the Rosenberg Case
53	4/25/54	" WASH POST & TIMES HERALD	1	0	OUTSIDE the Rosenberg Case
54	4/26/54	" WASH NEWS	3	0	outside the Rosenberg Case
55	4/26/54	" WASH. STAR	1	0	outside the Rosenberg Case
56	4/30/54	" N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE	1	0	outside the Rosenberg Case
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
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SECTION 4

APR. 18, 1954-APR. 30, 1954

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BRANIGAN

BAUMGARDNER

Review of The Week:

Spotlight Focuses

on 3 Inquiries

100-17828-A

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191 AUG 11 1954

Times-Herald _____
 Wash. Post _____
 Wash. News _____
 Wash. Star _____ A-21
 N.Y. Herald Tribune _____
 N.Y. Mirror _____

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55 AUG 16 1954

THREE-MAJOR Investigations—two legislative and one executive—gripped the attention of Washington last week.

In a secret room somewhere in Washington, a special board empaneled by the Atomic Energy Commission sat in judgment on the "security" of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, 50-year-old nuclear physicist who was the prime mover of the World War II atomic bomb project.

And on Capitol Hill, two committees contended over the right—or privilege—of investigating the Federal Housing Administration after President Eisenhower fired FHA's chief in the wake of discovery of irregularities in that loan-insurance agency.

Also in the shadow of the Capitol, the confusing case of the Army vs. Senator Joe McCarthy of Wisconsin seemed to be moving over a slow and devious route toward definitive open hearings on the question: Who is lying about whom?

Oppenheimer

When, on April 6, Senator McCarthy delivered his televised "answer" to commentator Edward R. Murrow, he surprised many of his listeners with this rhetorical question:

"If there were no Communists in our Government, why did we delay for 18 months—delay our research on the hydrogen bomb, even though our intelligence services were reporting, day after day, that the Russians were feverishly pushing their development on the hydrogen bomb?"

After his speech, Senator McCarthy subsided—but not for long. He is scheduled to make a major address next Wednesday at San Jacinto Day ceremonies outside Houston, Tex.

Most Americans had no idea what the Senator was talking about; indeed, some suspected he didn't either. But in Government and scientific circles it was an open secret that something was in the wind—probably not what the Senator had suggested in his TV talk, but sufficiently close to make his remarks convincing to those who admire the Senator and his works.

Friends-Counsel Release

So friends of Dr. Oppenheimer counseled him to make public what he and they knew—that he had been suspended from access to "Q" material (the super top-secret classification reserved for atomic energy data), and from AEC work generally. The thinking of Dr. Oppenheimer's advisers seemed to be: Better the public get the facts now than a hyped-up, McCarthyized version later. Dr. Oppenheimer accepted this advice.

The facts that emerged were these:

- On December 23, 1953, General Manager K. D. Nichols of the Atomic Energy Commission notified Dr. Oppenheimer by letter that the physicist was being suspended as an AEC consultant pending the finding of a security board.

- On March 4, 1954, Dr. Oppenheimer replied, in a letter about 11,000 words long, to Mr. Nichols' notice of suspension.

In the December letter, Gen. Nichols outlined the "unresolved questions" of security which he said were raised by an examination of Dr. Oppenheimer's file. Chief points alleged were that the scientist had associated with Communists (including his brother and sister-in-law); had courted one Red and married an ex-Communist; had contributed to Red causes in the early '40s; had hired Communists at the Los Alamos laboratory in New Mexico; had given conflicting information to the FBI about certain Communist meetings in the immediate pre-war period; had failed to report immediately an attempt to worm secrets out of him (an attempt he rebuffed instantly); and had opposed development of the hydrogen bomb, both before and after the decision was made to go ahead with its manufacture.

Physicist's Answer

Dr. Oppenheimer's answer was to admit some of the charges, deny others, and ask the commission to examine the derogatory information in its file "in the context of my life and work." He asked for a chance to vindicate himself.

The special board to handle the Oppenheimer case was headed by Gordon Gray, former Secretary of the Army in the Truman administration. The other members were Thomas Morgan, industrialist, and Ward V. Evans, chemistry professor at Tulane. The board apparently began hearings last week.

It was apparent to those who had been following the development of atomic energy over the years that most of the things alleged in the AEC letter were old stuff. On at least two occasions, the matter had been studied closely. On both occasions, Dr. Oppenheimer was cleared.

Nevertheless, according to an

AEC statement made public last Tuesday, President Eisenhower himself "directed that pending a security review of the material in the file, a blank wall be placed between Dr. Oppenheimer and any secret data. . . ."

Two Alternatives

The case offered two interesting and rather disturbing alternatives:

- (1) If Dr. Oppenheimer is shown not to be a security risk, will not many actual and potential atomic experts decide in future to shun Government service because of what they might regard as the harassment involved?

- (2) If this man, who more than any one made the atomic bomb possible, is shown to be a risk, how secure is American security in the nuclear field? (And if the board establishes the validity of AEC's doubts as to Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty, does America have any secrets to safeguard?)

Many of the men close to Dr. Oppenheimer were quick to vouch publicly for his good faith. And an angry letter was turned up in which Dr. Edward U. Condon took the physicist to task for commenting adversely on the reliability of a fellow scientist. Since Dr. Condon, former head of the National Bureau of Standards, has been characterized by congressional Red hunters as "the weakest link in our security chain," his letter appeared to be a case of praising with faint damns.

The immediate reaction seemed to be that all would come out in the wash: Either Dr. Oppenheimer would be cleared once and for all, and restored to the Government's good graces, or he would be labeled a clear security risk, and that would write "finis" to his Government career.

But even this was in doubt as the week ended, in the light of the case of Abraham Chasanow of Greenbelt, Md. Mr. Chasanow, an \$8,350-a-year section chief at the Navy Hydrographic Office, had been suspended as a security risk and had fought the charges through a security hearing board. The board upheld him completely by a unanimous vote, cleared him of all left-wing connections, and recommended his restoration to duty.

Last week, a Navy Department security appeal board overruled these findings and the Navy fired Mr. Chasanow without further explanation.

Hollyday

Far from the Ivory tower of atomic energy, what looked to be a first-rate scandal was developing last week. The Federal Housing Administration, which insures private lending institutions against loss on home and apartment mortgages, was in a turmoil after the "resignation" of its commissioner, Guy T. O. Hollyday, a Baltimore mortgage banker. The word resignation is in quotes advisedly: Apparently Mr. Hollyday was out before he knew it, and his resignation

accepted before it was submitted.

In forcing Mr. Hollyday out, no one accused him, personally, of shenanigans. But it was made clear that shenanigans had taken place, and that Mr. Hollyday had known about irregularities without doing anything about them.

Chief apparent irregularities were in FHA guaranty practices and in high-pressure salesmanship and misuse of money derived from home improvement loans.

Two Curiosities

Two curiosities cropped up in the wake of Mr. Hollyday's resignation. One was an extremely friendly letter from Housing and Home Finance Administrator Albert M. Cole last January, congratulating Mr. Hollyday on "the work you have been doing to correct abuses in connection with Title I lending." The other was a jurisdictional dispute between two congressional committees over who would investigate what looked like a juicy mess.

Virginia's Democratic Senator Harry F. Byrd, announced plans to open hearings Tuesday on "unconscionable profits . . . made by many in construction projects sponsored by the Federal Government under its housing programs." Senator Byrd said he and his Joint Committee on Nonessential Federal Expenditures had been looking into the housing situation for a year.

Meanwhile, Senator Homer Capehart, Indiana Republican who heads the Banking and Currency Committee, asserted jurisdiction. He asked for a quarter-million dollars to carry on an inquiry into the housing program, and set tomorrow for the opening date. Because his committee handles housing bills, Senator Capehart said, the group voted to take "100 per cent jurisdiction."

Whoever investigates, it is likely that the spotlight will be on the housing picture in the Washington area. More than one-tenth of all FHA rental housing loans throughout the country have been made here.

McCarthy

The Oppenheimer case was under way, however secretly. The housing imbroglio appeared certain to go under the magnifying glass this week, one way or the other—and perhaps both. But there was room for doubt that the noisiest of the three investigations would get off the ground, as scheduled, this Thursday.

Originally, it had been planned to start the open hearings in the feud between Senator McCarthy and his precocious counsel, Roy Cohn (on the one hand) and Army Secretary Robert T. Stevens and Army Counsel John G. Adams (on the other) this Wednesday. But—as mentioned in the "Oppenheimer" section above—Senator McCarthy was scheduled for a Wednesday speaking date in Texas. So the hearing was postponed 24 hours by Temporary

Chairman Karl Mundt, South Dakota Republican.

The truncated Senate Permanent Investigating Subcommittee having settled on Ray Jenkins of Tennessee as its special counsel, it got down to work last week. At Mr. Jenkins' insistence, the committee adopted a rule against public statements and appearances by staff members. Then the counsel called on the Army for a detailed statement of charges and on the other side for an answer.

The Leak

After two or three false starts, however, things began to look good for a Thursday opening. Then Democratic Senator Symington of Missouri got reports of a "leak" by which two reporters had been given copies of the Army's statement of charges. The Senator decided to stop the leak by destroying the dam: He made public the whole Army indictment without restriction.

This release caught the committee unawares. It also infuriated Senator McCarthy and Mr. Cohn, who demanded an inquiry into responsibility for the original leak, and said they would boycott the investigation until responsibility is fixed and action taken.

Whether the anger of the Senator and his aide was tactical or actual was not clear. Mr. Cohn spoke of the Army charges as a "one-sided smear" and expressed outrage that the leak should have occurred.

But in the cold glare of publicity, the Army's "statement of charges" did not seem greatly different from the original diary-form narrative that had given rise to demands for the hearings which —Joe McCarthy willing—will start on Thursday.

The boycott seemed short-lived, however. Yesterday, Senator McCarthy's office said the McCarthy-Cohn answer—in the form of a "bill of particulars"—would be forthcoming tomorrow, when the committee is scheduled to go into closed session.

Meanwhile, Senator Mundt was pressing to get Senator McCarthy to waive his normal right as a committee member to question witnesses.

Pre-Geneva

SECRETARY OF STATE John Foster Dulles went shopping in Europe early last week and brought back an Easter basket with nothing but excelsior inside.

The fancy ribbons and bows were British and French agreements to talk about erecting a 10-nation Pacific defense organization like NATO after the Geneva conference, which opens a week from tomorrow.

The excelsior was the dead Dulles hope of getting a pre-Geneva threat from Britain and France to support "united action" if necessary to prevent the fall of Indo-China to communism.

The Soviet Union and Com-

munist China are going to Geneva next week to talk over settlements of the cold Korean war and the hot Indo-China war with the Western Big Three and other belligerents in the two conflicts.

Mr. Dulles is worried that France, weary of the 7-year-old war in Indo-China, will arrange a cease-fire too advantageous to the Communists. For the past month he has been preparing his home public for new sacrifices to help the French stick it out until the Communist rebels in Indo-China are beaten.

No Foreclosure on Peace

But Britain and France don't want to foreclose the possibility of getting peace in Indo-China before the Geneva conference even starts. Their view has prevailed, it was clear last week.

The preparation of American public opinion for all-out involvement in Indo-China continued, meanwhile. Vice President Nixon said Friday that if France were to pull her troops out of Indo-China, American boys should be sent to save it. So far, of course, France has made no move to withdraw her soldiers. The administration trial balloon, however, was peppered with flak from Capitol Hill.

The Big Three agreement to talk about a Southeast Asia defense agreement is a tricky package, too. Until last week, Mr. Dulles and the State Department have pointedly kept Britain and France out of United States Pacific alliances. Previous Franco-British pleas to get into the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) defense pact have been turned down flatly and repeatedly because America wanted to avoid the taint of colonialism which British and French membership would bring from Malaya and Indo-China. To the extent that this position was abandoned, Mr. Dulles lost ground at London and Paris last week, while Anthony Eden and Georges Bidault gained. The American Secretary of State, of course, now rates the importance of a united front against communism in Asia—even after Geneva—worth the risk of incurring Asiatic taunts about a white man's alliance to perpetuate colonialism in the Far East.

Indo-China

The colonialist aspects of the Indo-China war also must have been worrying Mr. Dulles, although he obviously could not speak publicly of them because of the delicate French position on the European army. There were no such restrictions on the United States Senate, however, and it was there that American pressure was building to erase colonialism as an issue in Indo-China before this country steps deeper into the war.

Senator Mike Mansfield, Democrat of Montana suggested that the French and the Associated States set a definite date for full independence, something the Viet Nameese have been trying fruitlessly

to arrange since last July. The Senator also proposed that this country send three ambassadors to the three countries, instead of one; that constituent assemblies be convened in the three states as a first step toward broadening popular representation in the government; and that French citizenship of all nationalist leaders in Indo-China be relinquished.

Viet Nameese nationalists, thinking along the same lines, last week suddenly lined up solidly with Chief of State Bao Dai, whom they generally regard as too pro-French, in preparation for his Paris talks on independence. Bao Dai, in another move which appeared to be clearing the decks for an all-out effort to obtain full independence for his people, ordered full mobilization of all able-bodied young men between 21 and 25. It was estimated the move would ultimately bring about 200,000 additional troops into the Viet Nameese national army.

Superiority in troop numbers alone will not decide the issue in Indo-China, however. The Viet Nameese and French already have a 5-to-3 manpower edge, but are far from defeating the Reds. Nor will granting independence bring victory overnight. Besides freedom, the Indo-Chinese need training, not only in war-making but in peace-keeping and the routine jobs of government. That is why advocates of independence for the Associated States avoid demanding immediate freedom. The most optimistic think the three states need at least five years to get ready, others claim it should be a minimum of 10.

Dien Bien Phu

The battle for Dien Bien Phu, which started March 13, raged on in northwestern Viet Nam last week but the pace seemed slightly less grueling. The Viet Minh apparently were regrouping for the third round of assaults. They did launch one attack which wrested a corner of the only remaining airstrip from the stout Viet Nameese and French Union defenders.

Col. Christian de Castries, commander of the bastion, sent counterattacking tank and infantry forces to work the Reds over, but there was no indication at the week end that the Viet Minh could be budged. Until they are, De Castries will have to depend exclusively on air drops for his supplies. With the rainy season scheduled to start in a week or two, this will be an increasingly difficult operation.

The colorful De Castries kept in the news in another way last week when reports sifted through French censorship that he had threatened to resign if the French government didn't come across with his promotion to brigadier general. President Eisenhower was the instigator of the promotion idea, and the French National Assembly went along. But the French government wanted to wait awhile.

Last week, however, the government bowed to the inevitable and promoted the defender of Dien Bien Phu to brigadier general's rank.

Other Fighting

Action in Indo-China was not confined to the Dien Bien Phu area, by any means. The Franco-Viet Nameese roll-up operation in south-central Viet Nam continued, as Viet Nameese officials took over administration of territory as fast as the military liberated it. In central Laos, where the Viet Minh last year launched a meaningless offensive, the French attacked Communist positions in a river valley.

And in Cambodia, King Norodom Sihanouk prepared to lead a counterattack against the Viet Minh who recently invaded his country. More important, possibly, he sent a protest, outside of French channels, to the United Nations (of which Cambodia is not a member) about the recent Viet Minh invasion of the northeastern section of the country.

Korea

Almost forgotten in the preparations for Geneva has been the other item on the agenda, Korea. President Syngman Rhee of South Korea has still not made up his mind whether to send a representative. He sees little hope for peaceful accomplishment of Korean unification, while preserving his own position at the helm. So he gets little thrill out of the idea of going to Geneva to talk some more with Korean, Chinese and Russian Communists about some other solution which would not be acceptable to him.

Last week Dr. Rhee informed the United States that his price for going to Geneva is a reversal of the planned withdrawal of American divisions from South Korea. Gen. John E. Hull, Far Eastern commander, flew from Tokyo to Korea for secret talks with Dr. Rhee to try to work something out.

EDC

PROSPECTS FOR French action on the six-nation European Defense Community treaty took a turn for the better last week.

The National Assembly will meet May 18, it was announced, to set a date for debate of EDC. The cabinet hopes debate can start May 25. Thus Premier Joseph Laniel and Foreign Minister Georges Bidault stopped the international braying over their cautious approach to an Assembly vote on the European army plan.

They got some important concessions from Great Britain and the United States to help them face the political clamor at home. Both the allies pledged themselves publicly to keep troops on the continent as long as Soviet Russia is a threat.

Britain promised an armored division and air units would be put under the control of the six-nation European army commander. She also will maintain close political ties to the EDC.

The United States, for its part, announced it would keep "appropriate" forces in Europe as long as they are needed to help fend off any Soviet aggression. President Eisenhower, in a message to the Premiers of the six EDC countries, also promised, in effect, to guard against any revival of unilateral German militarism.

The Saar Roadblock

Only other major roadblock to French action on EDC is some satisfactory settlement of the Saar problem. Both France and Germany want economic relations with the coal-rich Saar. They have agreed in principle to internationalize the sector, but France wants to hold its exclusive rights to economic relations with the Saar until the European political community comes into effect. Germany is afraid the interim period might be too long, and demands a two-year time limit on its waiting period, regardless of the progress on political union.

M. Bidault will try to get this matter ironed out with Chancellor Konrad Adenauer before May 18.

Politics

THE EIGHT-MONTH-LONG 1954 political season was opened formally in Illinois last week when Democrats and Republicans chose candidates for the November congressional elections.


In the Senate race, incumbent Paul H. Douglas was unopposed for the Democratic nomination. Joseph T. Meek, a lobbyist for a retail trade association and a middle-of-the-roader, won the G. O. P. nomination over a field of nine. The outlook is for a "liberal" vs. "businessman" campaign.

All incumbents were renominated for Illinois' 25 House seats.

Next primary will be in New Jersey on Tuesday.



OPPENHEIMER: Noted physicist reveals his suspension as a 'security risk' as a special three-man panel investigates his prewar associations.



MCCARTHY: Wisconsin's junior Senator and his aide, Roy Cohn, gird for the big battle with Army leadership.



HOUSING: Senator Byrd claims jurisdiction over housing scandal . . .



. . . after FHA's Commissioner Guy Hollyday 'resigns' by request . . .



. . . but Senator Capehart of Indiana moves to take over the investigation.

Mr. Tolson.....
 Mr. Boardman.....
 Mr. Nichols.....
 Mr. Belmont.....
 Mr. Glavin.....
 Mr. Harbo.....
 Mr. Rosen.....
 Mr. Tamm.....
 Mr. Tracy.....
 Mr. Mohr.....
 Mr. Winterrowd.....
 Tele. Room.....
 Mr. Holloman.....
 Miss Gandy.....

BRANIGAN

THE DRAMA OF THE HYDROGEN BOMB—AND DR. OPPENHEIMER'S KEY ROLE

Security Case Focuses Attention on Disputes That Preceded
 First Successful Test of H-Bomb at Pacific Proving Ground

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N.Y. TIMES

DATED APR 18 1954

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AUG 18 1954

By E. W. KENWORTHY

Fifteen years ago this month a paper in the Physical Review set the United States on the course that led to Eniwetok. Those years wrought greater changes than any comparable period in the whole sweep of history. What follows is a brief account of the H-bomb, the men who made it, the problems it poses.

1. THE BEGINNINGS

The atomic age began theoretically in 1905 when Albert Einstein advanced the proposition that matter could be converted into energy.

It began actually thirty-three years later in the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute not many miles from Hitler's Chancellery. On a day late in 1938, physicists Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassman proved the Einstein theory by bombarding uranium with neutrons. The uranium atom was split into lighter elements; in the fission, some matter was converted into energy with explosive force. That small flash was the precursor of the A-bomb and the H-bomb.

Soon after, Lise Meitner, who worked with Hahn, fled Germany. She passed the news on to Niels Bohr in Copenhagen. At a conference later in Washington, Bohr and Enrico Fermi, a refugee Italian physicist working at Columbia, put their heads together. In April, 1939, Fermi and Leo Szilard published a paper on their own researches on the bombardment of uranium. Einstein read it. He, Szilard and Eugene O. Wigner of Princeton met with Alexander Sachs of the Lehman Corporation to discuss the possibility of an atomic bomb.

On Oct. 11, 1939, Sachs read to President Roosevelt a letter from Einstein and a memo from Szilard. The President ordered an Advisory Committee on Uranium to be set up. In February, 1940, \$6,000 was allotted for the work at Columbia. In June the Uranium Committee was placed under the newly created National Defense Research Committee (later the Office of Scientific Research and Development) headed by Dr. Vannevar Bush. After Pearl Harbor, the decision was made to go all-out.

Through 1942, the laboratory work went forward at tremendous speed. At Columbia, the Substitute Alloy Material (SAM) Laboratory under Harold Urey was developing and testing the gaseous diffusion process of separating out the uranium isotope U-235. At the University of California in Berkeley, scientists in the Radiation Laboratory under the direction of Ernest O. Lawrence worked on the electromagnetic process of separating U-235. At the Argonne Laboratory



at the University of Chicago, physicists under Fermi were constructing a pilot atomic pile (sketch above), and at the end of the year the Metallurgical Laboratory under Arthur Compton began working on the production of plutonium.

While the laboratory agents

went forward, the Government began planning production. In the fall of 1942, Gen. Leslie R. Groves was made head of the overall Manhattan Engineer District. Before the year was out, the M. E. D. had begun the construction of the vast U-235 complex at Oak Ridge, Tenn., and the plutonium plant at Hanford, Wash.

At the same time, General Groves acquired a site in the New Mexico desert—the Los Alamos Ranch—about thirty-five miles from Santa Fe. Here in April, 1943, the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory was set up to work on the actual bomb. The man put in charge of Los Alamos was J. Robert Oppenheimer, a theoretical physicist from Berkeley.


2. THE TRIGGER

Dr. Oppenheimer's plans called for an initial staff of 100 highly trained scientists and technicians. By the spring of 1945, Los Alamos had a staff of nearly 4,000.

Recruitment was a terrific problem. The nation was at war. Most scientists were already engaged on other essential defense work. Life at Los Alamos was not an inviting prospect. It was a military post. The scientists were asked to sign up for the duration.

The burden of recruitment fell largely on Dr. Oppenheimer. For months he traveled about the country, persuading scientists of the urgency of the work they would be doing. His fervor was infectious. Few scientists refused him.

Security considerations had been uppermost in the selection of Los Alamos. But the Army did not rely on remoteness. The whole area was fenced and constantly patrolled by armed guards like those shown be-



was the draftsman, David Greenglas, who worked on a lens mold. On a Sunday morning in June, 1945, he met Soviet agent Harry Gold in Albuquerque, and gave him drawings of the bomb.

For the scientists at Los Alamos, life was made up of problems, heart-breaks and triumphs. It was an austere, dedicated life. The problems were of a kind that required unhurried concentration. But the scientists worked under the awful urgency of knowing that the bomb could turn the tide of war and of not knowing how far along the Germans were.

Dr. Oppenheimer has telescoped the Los Alamos story in these words:

"Time and again we had in the technical work almost paralyzing crises. Time and again the laboratory drew itself together and faced the new problems and got on with the work. We worked by night and by day; and in the end the many jobs were done."

On July 16, 1945, this mushroom cloud rose out of the desert at Alamogordo.



On the day of Hiroshima, Secretary Stimson said:

"The development of the bomb itself has been largely due to his [Dr. Oppenheimer's] genius and the inspiration and leadership he has given to his associates."

Even as the bombs dropped on Japan, the scientists at Los Alamos were discussing the future of atomic energy. The fissionable atom, in a world at peace, could multiply the wealth of mankind. It could also, in a world not at peace, become the trigger for a vastly more powerful thermonuclear bomb.

3. THE HIATUS

In the fall of 1945, the nation knew little and cared less about H-bombs. The A-bomb was felt to be plenty big enough. It had stunned the world with its power. The problem was how to control it.

This was the Indian summer of large hopes—in the unity of the victors, in the United Nations, in permanent peace. United States forces were quickly brought home and demobilized. The Congress set to work on plans for civilian control of atomic energy. The Government set to work on plans for international control of atomic armaments.

The Indian summer became a cold winter and a false spring. In June, 1946, Russia flatly turned down the Baruch plan for international control of atomic energy. As Dr. Oppenheimer, who had been a consultant to Mr. Baruch, wrote later: "Openness, friendliness and cooperation did not seem to be what the Soviet Government most prized on this earth. . . . Instead we came to grips . . . with the massive

low. Mail was censored. All telephone calls monitored. The scientists were permitted to leave the post only on business, or for the most urgent personal reasons. When they left, they were kept under surveillance.

There was good reason for the precautions. The Army Counter Intelligence Corps and the F. B. I. had ample evidence that the Communists knew much and were after more. Under the direction of Steve Nelson, openly the party organizer of the San Francisco Bay Area and covertly an NKVD agent in charge of atomic espionage, the Communists had managed to plant a small cell in the Radiation Laboratory at Berkley.

A few months before Dr. Oppenheimer had left for Los Alamos, the Communists had made approaches to him through an old friend. According to testimony in postwar Congressional hearings, Dr. Oppenheimer had replied that the giving of information would be "treasonable." But he failed to report the incident until several months after it occurred.

Despite all the precautions, Los Alamos was not spy-proof. For almost two years—from August, 1944 to June, 1946—Klaus Fuchs worked at Los Alamos, sitting in on the most secret sessions. At Los Alamos, also,

evidence of Soviet hostility and the growing evidences of Soviet power. . . .

This massive evidence did not bring a reversal of the post-war cutbacks in American armed strength. Instead the nation placed its reliance on its A-bomb monopoly, confident that Russia would require at least five years and possibly ten to solve the riddle, by which time the United States would have a formidable stockpile. This confidence was vaporized on Sept. 23, 1949.

The Soviet explosion jolted the Government. Some officials urged on the President an all-out "crash" program to build "the Super"—the H-bomb. Among them was Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, a member of the Atomic Energy Commission. A tremendous controversy began in the most secret councils of the nation.

The Atomic Energy Commission in October called for a special meeting of the General Advisory Committee of scientists, of which Dr. Oppenheimer was chairman. The A. E. C. asked for an opinion on the "crash" program. The S. A. C. reported back before the month was out. Unanimously it opposed the crash program. Behind the committee's opposition were these considerations:

There was the question of feasibility. The committee estimated that with "an imaginative and concerted attack," there was a "better than even chance" of producing the H-bomb within five years. But there were tremendous technical difficulties to solve. Some scientists doubted whether the intense heat of the A-bomb could be concentrated long enough to set off the H-bomb.

There was the question of atomic "drain." At that time, plans called for using tritium as the key component in the H-bomb charge. The production of tritium would utilize facilities otherwise capable of producing plutonium for A-bombs. The scientists doubted whether this drain was justified when the nation already had A-bombs more powerful than those that had knocked out Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

There was also the question of defense. Dr. Oppenheimer (shown with Dr. Einstein below) felt strongly



that continental defenses could be strengthened.

Finally there was the big question of basing the nation's security chiefly on strategic atom-bombing. Many scientists agreed with top Army and Navy officials that the atomic bomb was not an "ultimate" weapon, and that there were many local situations in which it could not be used. The enemy's knowledge of the bomb's limitations — together with his confidence that the U. S. would not initiate a massive atom-

war against cities—might encourage local aggression, it was argued.

Therefore, the scientists recommended concentration on large A-bombs; a family of atom weapons (already under way at Los Alamos) that could be used in tactical support of ground troops, and an enlarged air defense network.

Within the A. E. C., Chairman David E. Lillenthal (below, talking with Senator Brien McMahon), Sum-



ner T. Pike, Dr. Henry D. Smyth aligned themselves with the Advisory Committee. Admiral Strauss and Gordon Dean dissented. The President turned the controversy over to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and Mr. Lillenthal. The three men met on Jan. 31, 1950. Mr. Acheson and Mr. Johnson favored the crash program. The committee walked across the street to the White House. The President listened to the arguments. That afternoon he gave the go-ahead on the H-bomb.

4. BUILDING THE BOMB

Work on the H-bomb got under way immediately at Los Alamos. In charge of the program was Dr. Edward Teller, the Hungarian-born physicist who had long been at work on the theoretical problems.

At the outset, planning was based on the assumption that the H-bomb would use tritium, and in January, 1951, ground was broken on a billion-dollar plant at Savannah River, South Carolina, to produce the tritium.

Meanwhile, however, Teller was working on a revolutionary scheme that might obviate the need of tritium. At Eniwetok in the spring of 1951, it was reported that a device was tested which established the soundness of his theory. From then on things moved with tremendous speed. Teller was installed at the A. E. C. laboratory in Livermore, Calif., which became the Los Alamos of the H-bomb.

As the work on the H-bomb continued, so did the controversy. The scientists who had warned against excessive reliance on strategic atomic bombs found point for their warnings in the Korean war.

In a speech to the New York Bar Association in January, 1951, Dr. Oppenheimer raised again the question of the military uses of the atom as against the political uses as a deterrent:

"They [atomic bombs] are not primarily weapons of totality or terror, but weapons used to give combat forces help that they would otherwise lack. Only when the atomic bomb is recognized . . . as an integral part of military operations, will it really be of much help in the fighting of a war, rather

than in warning all mankind to avert it."

Again dealing with the dangers of using the Super as a deterrent, he said that this may be "a fine thing," but he asked, "What happens if the fighting starts?" He quoted Admiral Ralph A. Ostsie: ["When we talk of strategic bombing] we are talking of attacks on cities. . . . The idea that it is within our power to inflict maximum damage upon the enemy in a short time without serious risk to ourselves creates the delusion that we are stronger than we actually are."

The whole question of national policy had obviously become vastly complex. The scientist was no longer merely the hand-maiden to the military, nor the consultant to the civilian policy-makers. Inevitably he found himself thrust—or because of deep concern, thrust himself—into questions of military strategy and diplomacy.

The excursions of the scientists into the realm of policy, and especially after decisions had been made, aroused some resentment in high quarters. It is not known whether this resentment was one of the reasons that Dr. Oppenheimer was not reappointed to the General Advisory Committee when his term expired in June, 1952, but made a consultant for one year.

On Nov. 2, 1952, the first H-bomb (below) was shot at Eniwetok.



5. THE HYDROGEN AGE

The United States now had a Super-monopoly. The nation found some comfort in it, but not nearly so much as it had found in the A-bomb monopoly. The man in the street knew instinctively what the atomic physicist knew positively—that if the Russians could master the A-bomb, they could master the H-bomb, and that it would be only a matter of time before instruments in the free world would pick up radiation waves let loose in the fastnesses of Siberia.

The knowledge intensified the old controversy. But now there was intense public interest in the debate.

In public speeches the debate was earnest and dispassionate. But behind the scenes there were rumors, allegations, suspicions and charges, and some of these found their way into print. In May, 1953, Fortune Magazine ran a piece on "The Hidden Struggle for the H-bomb," which said that Dr. Teller "had reason to believe" that the Atomic Energy Commission "under Oppenheimer's influence" had tried "to postpone, if not stifle," the building of the H-bomb, and that Dr. Oppenheimer had "tried to stop the test" at Eniwetok.

Two months later an article by Dr. Oppenheimer on "Atomic Weapons and American Policy" got wide attention. He laid great stress on the need for defensive measures, and the need for "candor" with the American people and our Allies. He criticized "the great rigidity of policy."

In the week the Oppenheimer

article appeared, Admiral Strauss became the new chairman of the A. E. C. Four days after he took over, he ordered the removal of classified documents from Dr. Oppenheimer's custody, pending a review of his security file.

On Aug. 8, Malenkov announced that the American monopoly on the H-bomb had been ended.

Detection instruments not only confirmed this statement, but indicated—from the force of the explosion—that the Russians probably had the lithium secret. A tritium explosion of that force—the scientists believed—would have required an expenditure of atomic fuel the Russians would probably not have invested on a test.

A mood something like frenzy took hold of Washington, and it did not soon subside. The peak was reached in the first week in October when Defense Mobilizer Arthur S. Flemming said that Soviet Russia had the capacity to deliver "the most destructive weapon ever devised . . . on chosen targets in the United States"; Secretary of Defense Wilson said Russia was "three or four years back of where we are"; and W. Sterling Cole, chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, asked for expenditure of "10 billion a year on continental defense.

The President stepped in, saying that the Russians had the capacity to make "an atomic attack on us." He put an end to widespread reports that the Administration would launch "Operation Candor," a series of speeches on the whole atomic situation. He said, "We do not intend to disclose the details of our strength . . ." In mid-December he made his proposal for an atomic pool for peaceful purposes. Two weeks later, Dr. Oppenheimer was

called in by Admiral Strauss and given the alternative of resigning as consultant to the A. E. C. or facing a security hearing.

The March tests at Bikini raised a new storm, as the nation and world were shown pictures of the 1952 explosion that obliterated a small island and were informed by Admiral Strauss that March 1 blast would have destroyed Manhattan.

The President said the U. S. saw no need for building a bigger bomb. This did not dispel the fears, for the nation was also told that if the Bikini bomb were encased in a cobalt sheath, the explosion would send a deadly radioactive cobalt dust cloud over thousands of square miles.

"Knowledge comes," said Tennyson, "but wisdom lingers." The world now had the knowledge to destroy itself. The question was whether it could command the wisdom to save itself.

PICTURE CREDITS

Photos in the above article were taken by U. S. Army, U. S. Air Force, Associated Press, The New York Times (Gertrude Samuels).



Mr. Tolson _____
 Mr. Boardman _____
 Mr. Nichols *20/4* _____
 Mr. Belmont *AKC* _____
 Mr. Glavin _____
 Mr. Harbo _____
 Mr. Rosen _____
 Mr. Tamm _____
 Mr. Tracy _____
 Mr. Mohr _____
 Mr. Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Mr. Holloman _____
 Miss Gandy _____

Book

(OPPENHEIMER)

CHICAGO--THE BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTIST, CRITICIZING THE SUSPENSION OF J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER, SAID "NO NATION EVER FLOURISHED BY REWARDING PUBLIC SERVICE WITH INSULT."

THE PUBLICATION, THE WORK OF A GROUP OF CHICAGO ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, SAID THE REVIVAL OF OLD SECURITY CHARGES AGAINST OPPENHEIMER APPEARED TO BE "CONTRARY TO BOTH DECENCY AND COMMON SENSE."

THE STATEMENT RELEASED YESTERDAY WAS INTENDED AS AN EDITORIAL FOR THE MAY ISSUE. IT WAS SIGNED BY EDITOR EUGENE RABINOWITCH AND SUCH UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ATOMIC SPECIALISTS AS HAROLD C. UREY, LEO SZILARD AND SAMUEL ALLISON.

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✓ Tolson ✓
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These Days By George Sokolsky

Scientists as Liberals

FOR MANY months I received, as did thousands of other Americans, circular brochures issued in Chicago by atomic scientists, many of them still employed by the Government of the United States, who differed with the official policy of this country on the use of information concerning atomic fission and the prospects of a thermonuclear bomb.



Sokolsky

For the layman, not particularly versed or interested in science or in the disputations among scientists, these brochures presented the picture of employees of the Government opposing their employer. He a bit ran that, as citizens, these Government-employed scientists had as much right as any other citizen to express their opinions or to conduct a propaganda in favor of their point of view. Most of them supported the concept that secrecy in this field was

wrong; the expansion of these bombs as instruments of war was immoral; that the Baruch Plan in the United Nations was unduly anti-Russian and so forth.

The immorality of the expansion of the bomb into more terrible instruments of warfare cannot be denied. It seemed to me at the time that these scientists were suffering from the guilt of their own ingenuity. On the other hand, so much of their argument was in line with the Russian position in the United Nations that it was impossible not to wonder whether they were not guided more by their politics than by moral indignation.

J. ROBERT Oppenheimer's opposition to the development of the thermonuclear bomb must be related in time to his knowledge of the work on the thermonuclear bomb that was actually being done in Soviet Russia. He should have known how much knowledge of this subject Dr. Klaus Fuchs possessed; he probably knew how much the well-informed Britishers, Donald MacLean and Guy Burgess, possessed.

We all know that Dr. Bruno Pontecorvo escaped to Russia in 1950 and that it was generally presumed that he took with him a sample of tritium, which is a chief ingredient of the hydrogen bomb. A scientist of Dr. Oppenheimer's stature could assess the danger of Pontecorvo's desertion.

Men who are employed on these secret defensive measures have a free choice to accept such employment and to give up their private opinions or to refuse such employment and to hold to their private opinions. Professor Francis W. Coker, of Yale University, stated the case of the modern liberal as follows:

"When the modern liberal has challenged the reasonableness or justice of particular orders made by official spokesmen for a ruling group, he has sometimes been rebuked as an advocate of disorder or disunity; or if he has appealed for the restoration of earlier freedoms, he has been rebuffed as one vainly trying to revive outmoded ideas. When, in a community with a democratic form of government, he challenges the justice or practicality of a particular

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The Washington Post
 and Times Herald

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Date:

decision of the official political majority, he is represented as rejecting the principle of majority rule . . ."

THIS, OF course, relates to the man who is not bound by commitments other than his own sense of responsibility. The atomic scientist, however, accepted employment in what is actually a military operation, the provision of adequate weapons for defense of the United States. Such persons were bound to secrecy because the Government so chose and the Government alone has the legal right to determine, either by Act of Congress or by executive regulation, what is to be secret and what is to be publicly disclosed. If each private citizen were to use his own judgment and choice in such matters, there would be no orderly government; there would be anarchy.

Actually, what the scien-

tists of liberal persuasions sought to establish was that private opinion ought to prevail over Government decisions when a conflict of view appeared. That undoubtedly was the view of Julius Rosenberg. His advocates adopted the view that as there was no secret about the atomic sciences, he disclosed nothing secret. It is a view widely held these days. The answer is that it is for the Government to decide what it wishes to disclose about its weapons.

This, it seems to me, is the issue in the Oppenheimer case. When Dr. Oppenheimer was approached by Haakon Chevallier to disclose secrets, his responsibility was to report instantly. That he did not do. The rest is commentary.

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Veil Over Oppenheimer Case

By Drew Pearson

The secret of the A-bomb may have been carefully guarded at Los Alamos, but not more so than the present whereabouts



of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, the man who presided over Los Alamos. Five Life magazine photographers and news-sleuths have been scouring the area where Oppie is supposed to be hiding out, but so far not one fleeting, slithering glimpse of him.

Pearson

All week the Oppenheimer loyalty hearing has been taking place in Washington, but where nobody knows. Neither the three-man loyalty board nor the doctor himself can be located.

Lloyd Garrison, attorney for the atomic scientist, is just as mysterious as his client. However, though the Oppenheimer hearings are a better-kept secret than the hydrogen bomb, word has leaked out that the three-panel board has been giving Oppie a rough time. First, they raised Cain with him for releasing the text of his reply to Atomic Energy Commission charges—though it had been specified in writing that he had every right to do so. The White House also was irked at the release. So now they have demanded that Oppenheimer be like the proverbial brass monkeys—say nothing, do nothing, see nothing.

Two key witnesses at the hearing have been Gen. Leslie Groves, head of the entire atomic energy project; and Gen. Fred Osborn, United States delegate to the U. N. Commission on Atomic Energy. Both were favorable to Oppenheimer. Osborn testified that when he was appointed to the U. N. Commission, Oppie warned him that the Russians were trying to steal the secret of the atom bomb and to be on his guard.

Washington Pipeline

Pentagon reports persist that a deal is in the works to save face for Joe McCarthy. Roy Cohn, brilliant burbling counsel of the McCarthy Committee, would get the ax, also John G. Adams, counsel for the Army.

Were Laws Violated?

Roly-poly Senator Mundt of South Dakota has announced that the charges against the Army, Roy Cohn, and Senator McCarthy cover "no acts of corruption punishable by law."

However, the genial gentleman from South Dakota did not study law at Carleton College. He should retain a good legal expert to see how many laws Cohn, McCarthy and the Army may have violated. If so, he will find that they may well have violated no fewer than 13 different statutes. Here are part of them:

Section 1505 of the Criminal Code makes it a criminal offense "by threats or force" to endeavor "to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness in any proceeding...in connection with any inquiry or investigation being held by either House or any committee of either House." Messrs. McCarthy's and Cohn's threat that the Army would get smeared and that Secretary Stevens would lose his job if Private Schine was not transferred back to New York, would seem to come under Section 1505.

Section 1913 forbids use of Government funds "to pay for any personal service...intended or designed to influence in any manner a member of Congress." If either Secretary Stevens or Army Counsel Adams gave any special favors to Private Schine, this statute might be involved.

- Tolson
- Boardman
- Nichols
- Belmont
- Glavin
- Harbo
- Rosen
- Tamm
- Tracy
- Mohr
- Winterrowd
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- Holloman
- Miss Gandy

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191 AUG 11 1954

The Washington Post
and Times Herald

5 AUG 12 1954

Date: APR 28 1954

Section 371, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in *Itas vs. Hankel*, 216 U. S. 462, covers any conspiracy "for the purpose of impairing, obstructing, or defeating the lawful functions of any department of Government." If Private Schine's military duty was used as a pawn in negotiations between McCarthy and Stevens, this section may have been violated.

Section 201 covers offers of any "thing of value" to influence either a Government department or a congressional committee. If Adams was offered a valuable law partnership as indicated in the allegations, in return for transferring Schine, this section might have been violated.

Sections 202, 215, and 214 cover the same question of influencing a Government official with a job offer, such as a law partnership.

Section 872 covers extortion. If McCarthy's charge that Private Schine was held as a "hostage" is true, then extortion would be involved.

Weekend Passes

Section 1018 covers false statements by public officials. Cohn claimed that Private Schine needed to get special leave from Fort Dix in order to work on McCarthy Commi-

tee reports. If untrue, and if Schine was seen in New York night clubs as reported, then Cohn may have violated this section, provided he made the statements in writing.

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FILE DESCRIPTION

BUREAU FILE

SUBJECT J. R. Oppenheimer

FILE NO. 100-17828 Sub A

SECTION NO. 5

SERIALS 1

THRU

56

guy/07

SUB A

File No: 100-17828Re: J.R. Oppenheimer

Date:

2/78

(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
1	4-26-54	N.Y. WORLD NEWS Clipping TELEGRAM & SUN	2	—	outside the R case
2	4-27-54	" " " " DAILY WORKER	1	1	
3	4-29-54	" " " " WASHINGTON CITY NEWS SERVICE	3	—	outside the R case
4	4-29-54	" " " " WASH. STAR	1	—	outside the R case
5	4-30-54	" " " " N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE	1	—	" " "
6	4-30-54	" " " " WASH. POST	1	—	" " "
7	4-30-54	" " " " WASH. STAR	1	—	" " "
8	4-30-54	" " " " N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE	2	—	" " "
9	4-30-54	" " " " WASH. POST AND TIMES HERALD	1	—	" " "
10	5-2-54	" " " " " "	7	—	" " "
11	5-1-54	" " " " " "	1	+	" " "
12	5-1-54	" " " " WASH. STAR	1	+	" " "

File No: 100-17828

Re: J.R. Oppenheimer

Date:

2/78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
13	5-1-54	NEWS CLIPPING WASH. NEWS	1	-	outside the case
14	5-3-54	" " N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE	2	-	" " "
15	5-3-54	" " THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR	1	-	" " "
16	5-6-54	" " WASHINGTON CITY NEWS SERVICE	1	-	" " "
17	5-6-54	" " "	1	-	" " "
18	5-6-54	" " "	1	-	" " "
19	5-7-54	" " WASH. STAR	1	-	" " "
20	5-7-54	" " WASHINGTON CITY NEWS SERVICE	1	-	" " "
21	5-7-54	" " "	1	-	" " "
22	5-7-54	" " WASH. POST AND TIMES HERALD	2	-	" " "
23	5-14-54	" " WASH. STAR	1	-	" " "
24	5-17-54	" " WASHINGTON CITY NEWS SERVICE	1	-	" " "

File No: 100-17828Re: J.R. OppenheimerDate: 2/78
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Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
37	5-24-54	NEWS Clipping N.Y. Post	1	-	outside the Case
38	5-24-54	" " WASHINGTON CITY NEWS SERVICE	1	-	" " "
39	5-24-54	" " "	1	-	" " "
40	5-25-54	" " Daily Worker	1	+	" " "
41	5-26-54	" " WASH. DAILY NEWS	2	-	" " "
42	5-28-54	" " WASH. POST AND TIMES HERALD	1	-	" " "
43	5-29-54	" " WASHINGTON CITY NEWS SERVICE	1	-	" " "
44	4-29-54	" " N.Y. TIMES	1	-	" " "
45	4-30-54	" " WASH. POST AND TIMES HERALD	2	-	" " "
46	6-1-54	" " WASHINGTON CITY NEWS SERVICE	1	-	" " "
47	6-1-54	" " "	1	-	" " "
48	6-1-54	" " "	1	+	" " "

File No: 100-17828Re: J. R. OppenheimerDate: 2/78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
49	6-1-54	WASHINGTON CITY NEWS CLIPPING NEWS SERVICE	1	—	outside the R case
50	6-1-54	" " " "	1	—	" " "
51	6-1-54	" " " "	1	—	" " "
52	6-1-54	" " " "	1	—	" " "
53	6-1-54	" " " "	5	—	" " "
54	6-1-54	" " " "	1	—	" " "
55	6-1-54	" " WASH. POST AND TIMES HERALD	1	—	" " "
56	6-1-54	" " WASHINGTON CITY NEWS SERVICE	1	—	" " "

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SECTION 5
APR. 26, 1954-JUNE 1, 1954

SOBELL SEES OPPENHEIMER CASE AS HYSTERIA PRODUCT

SAN FRANCISCO, April 26.—Mrs. Morton Sobell last week made her Easter visit to her husband in Alcatraz, Morton Sobell, the scientist sentenced to 30 years in prison. Mrs. Sobell travels the 3,000 miles from her home in New York to visit her husband. Her last trip to Alcatraz was on New Year's Eve. Her visits are made when her two children are on school holidays.

"We discussed the present Oppenheimer security case," Mrs. Sobell said. She recalled that her husband was not surprised that this kind of attack was occurring.

As far back as October, 1953, Sobell had written, "It is for each of us to conform, or else be labeled a traitor."

In a letter dated Oct. 7, 1953, Morton Sobell wrote:

"I was thinking, many eminent people have already pointed out that the loyalty oath was not designed to weed out the 'disloyal' and it's so apparent too. Rather it was calculated to put a terrible fear in the hearts of men, almost a fear of some unknown, with ever-changing standards, to suit the day-to-day needs of the witch hunters. Under such conditions only absolute conformity can guarantee



HELEN SOBELL

the safety of a scientist.

"This is why today we do not hear any real debate on the question of the morality of strategic bombing. The air force has set up its own standards, and it is for each of us to conform, or be labeled a traitor."

Mrs. Sobell said after her visit to Alcatraz: "Almost four years in prison, more than a year in Alcatraz, are beginning to leave signs of strain. Mort is working and studying, but he is beginning to wonder how long it will be before the truth is uncovered. He wants to come home to me and to the children a free man, and a vindicated one."

Further legal action in the Sobell case is being prepared both on the question of a new trial and on transfer from Alcatraz.

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191 AUG 10 1954

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Page 8 of the
Daily Worker

Date 4/27/54
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5 AUG 11

Young Scientists Oppose Attack on Dr. Oppenheimer

America's outstanding young scientists are "deeply troubled" by the "clumsy handling" of the current investigation of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer. Fortune Magazine reported this week.

Fortune based its findings to be published today on a poll of 50 of the nation's outstanding scientists under 40, selected at random from a group of 104 scientists named by order scientific leaders for another Fortune study.

The scientists were asked to check one of the following statements about the investigation of Oppenheimer:

"Unpardonable attack on outstanding American."

"Investigation justifiable in line with Administration's executive order of April, 1953."

Thirty-two per cent of the 43 responding scientists checked the first response. 26 per cent checked the second and 13 per cent checked both, Fortune reported. The magazine said 29 per cent chose to write "a variety of individual positions."

"On balance, the great majority of scientists surveyed seemed deeply troubled by what they considered the clumsy handling of the Oppenheimer case, even though all would undoubtedly concede the Government's right to investigate anyone it wished," the magazine said.

CHICAGO, May 20.—The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists said in an editorial today that the security clearance suspension of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer was a "breach of faith" by the government.

"It seems to us," the magazine said, "a breach of faith on the part of the government to call upon a man to assume such heavy responsibilities in full knowledge of his life history, and then, after he has demonstrably done his best and given the most valuable services to the nation, to use the facts which were substantially known all the time to cast aspersions on his integrity."

"These charges required examination when they were first made; but to revive them now from the irrelevance to which a brilliant record of national service had finally relegated them appears to us to be contrary to both decency and common sense. No nation has ever flourished by rewarding public service with insults."

The magazine published statements protesting the Oppenheimer suspension from 13 prominent scientists, and a letter of protest signed by 27 physicists of the Uni-

versity of Illinois.

Albert Einstein, physicist of the Institute for Advanced Study, said that "the systematic and widespread attempt to destroy mutual trust and confidence constitutes the severest possible blow against society."

Harold C. Urey, discover of heavy water, called the suspension "the most unjust and also the most foolish thing that has occurred in the current hysteria over spies, etc., which seems to be the dominant preoccupation today of the most powerful country in the world."

Samuel K. Allison, of the University of Chicago, one of the physicists who pioneered in development of the atom bomb, said the nation owes Oppenheimer a debt "which it can never adequately repay."

"I do not know any other person in the U.S. who could have provided the brilliant leadership at Los Alamos that he did, working in selfless devotion and endangering his precarious health," Allison said.

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191 AUG 10 1954 40

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Daily Worker
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FILE

55 AUG 12 1954

File for Bullwinkle

FILE DESCRIPTION

BUREAU FILE

SUBJECT J.R. Oppenheimer

FILE NO. 100-17828 SUB A

SECTION NO. 6

SERIALS JUNE 2, 1954

THRU

JUNE 3, 1954

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SUB A

File No: 100-17828Re: J.R. Oppenheimer

Date:

2/78

(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
1	8-10-54	WASHINGTON CITY NEWS CLIPPING NEWS SERVICE	1	1	outside the "R" case
2	8-10-54	" " " "	1	1	" " " "
3	6-2-54	" " " " N.Y. POST	3	-	" " " "
4	6-2-54	" " " " N.Y. WORLD TELEGRAM & SUN	1	1	" " " "
5	6-2-54	" " " " CHICAGO TRIBUNE	1	-	outside the "R" case
6	6-2-54	" " " " CHICAGO SUN-TIMES	1	-	" " " "
7	6-2-54	" " " " CHICAGO AMERICAN	1	T	" " " "
8	8-11-54	" " " " WASHINGTON CITY NEWS SERVICE	1	-	" " " "
9	6-2-54	" " " " WASH. POST. AND TIMES HERALD	3	-	" " " "
10	6-2-54	" " " " N.Y. MIRROR	3	3	" " " "
11	6-2-54	" " " " N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE	1	-	" " " "
12	6-2-54	" " " " " "	3	-	" " " "

File No: 100-17828Re: J. R. OppenheimerDate: 2/78
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Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
		LONDON			
13	6-2-54	NEWS clipping "DAILY EXPRESS"	1	-	outside the "R" case
14	6-2-54	" " CHICAGO AMERICAN	1	-	" " " "
15	8-10-54	" " WASHINGTON CITY NEWS SERVICE	1	-	" " " "
16	6-2-54	" " NEWARK EVENING NEWS	1	-	" " " "
17	6-2-54	" " BOSTON GLOBE	3	-	" " " "
18	6-2-54	" " WASH. STAR	4	-	" " " "
19	6-2-54	" " WASH. POST AND TIMES HERALD	1	-	" " " "
20	6-2-54	" " WASH. STAR	7	-	" " " "
21	6-2-54	" " DAILY LOCAL NEWS WEST CHESTER, PENNA.	2	-	" " " "
22	6-2-54	" " WASH. NEWS	2	-	" " " "
23	6-2-54	" " WASH. POST AND TIMES HERALD	2	-	" " " "
24	6-2-54	" " " "	17	-	" " " "

File No: 100-17828

Re: J. R. Oppenheimer

Date: 2/78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
25	6-2-54	WASH. POST AND NEWS CLIPPING TIMES HERALD	5	-	outside, the "R" case
26	6-2-54	" " - BOSTON TRAVELER	1	+	" " " "
27	6-3-54	" " THE BOSTON GLOBE	1	+	" " " "
28	6-3-54	" " WASH. POST AND TIMES HERALD	2	-	" " " "
29	6-3-54	" " THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER	2	2	" " " "
30	6-30-54	" " THE NEW MEXICAN	1	A	" " " "
31	8-10-54	" " WASHINGTON CITY NEWS SERVICE	1	-	" " " "
32	6-3-54	" " WASH. POST AND TIMES HERALD	1	+	" " " "
33	6-3-54	" " " "	2	-	" " " "
34	6-3-54	" " WASH. STAR	1	-	" " " "
35	6-3-54	" " N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE	1	-	" " " "
36	6-3-54	" " N.Y. MIRROR	1	-	" " " "

File No: 100-17828Re: J.R. OppenheimerDate: 2/78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
37	6-3-54	NEWS CLIPPING WASH. STAR	1	-	outside the "R" Case
38	6-3-54	" " "	1	-	" " " "
39	6-3-54	" " " N.Y. MIRROR	2	2	" " " "
40	8-10-54	" " WASHINGTON CITY NEWS SERVICE	1	-	outside the "R" Case
41	8-10-54	" " "	1	-	" " " "
42	8-10-54	" " "	1	-	" " " "
43	6-3-54	" " " N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE	1	-	" " " "
44	6-3-54	" " "	2	2	" " " "
45	6-3-54	" " WASH. POST AND TIMES HERALD	2	-	" " " "
46	6-3-54	" " " CHICAGO TRIBUNE	1	-	" " " "
47	6-3-54	" " " NEWARK STAR LEDGER	1	-	" " " "
48	6-3-54	" " " N.Y. TIMES	2	-	" " " "

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SUB A

File No: 100-17828Re: J.R. OppenheimerDate: 2/78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
49	6-3-54	NEWS CLIPPING THE EVENING BULLETIN, PHIL., PA.	1	—	outside the 2" line
50	6-3-54	" " N.Y. Journal American	1	—	" " " "
51	6-3-54	" " N.Y. NEWS	1	—	" " " "
52	6-3-54	" " CHICAGO DAILY NEWS	2	—	" " " "
53	6-3-54	" " N.Y. TIMES	2	—	" " " "
54	6-3-54	" " CHICAGO SUN-TIMES	2	—	" " " "
55	6-3-54	" " ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH	2	—	" " " "
56	6-3-54	" " ST. LOUIS GLOB DEMOCRAT	1	—	" " " "
57	6-3-54	" " N.Y. JOURNAL AMERICAN	1	—	" " " "
58	6-3-54	" " N.Y. BROOKLYN EAGLE	1	—	" " " "
59	6-3-54	" " THE SUN	1	—	" " " "
60	6-3-54	" " WASH. POST AND TIMES HERALD	1	—	" " " "

REVIEWED BY guy f. d'at

File No: 100-17828

Re: J. R. Oppenheimer

Date: 7/18
(month/year)

[illegible]


U. S. Department of Justice

(MATERIAL MUST NOT BE REMOVED FROM OR ADDED TO THIS FILE)

FEDERAL BUREAU

of

INVESTIGATION



USE CARE IN HANDLING THIS FILE

Transfer-Call 421

100

17828 SUB A

SECTION 6
JUNE 20 1954 - JUNE 30 1954

Mr. Tolson _____
 Mr. Boardman _____
 Mr. Nichols _____
 Mr. Belmont _____
 Mr. Harbo _____
 Mr. Mohr _____
 Mr. Parsons _____
 Mr. Rosen _____
 Mr. Tamm _____
 Mr. Sizoo _____
 Mr. Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Mr. Holloman _____
 Miss Gandy _____

BRANIGAN

Oppie Still Knows.

Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, according to the board which examined him, his antecedents and his actions, is a "loyal" and "discreet" American citizen, who nevertheless is not to be trusted with any future secrets of the Atomic Energy Commission.

You, who read this, are no more confused than we are, who have devoted the last several hours to reading the majority and minority reports culled from several thousand pages of testimony.

The board which made this finding was bound by the security regulations. It could not find otherwise than that Dr. Oppenheimer had been guilty of bad judgment in the company he kept, that like most scientists he had been naive in his political opinions. The board hardly could do other than resolve all doubts in favor of national security.

Yet there is no finding that Dr. Oppenheimer ever betrayed our country in any way. It was under his supervision that the United States developed the A-bomb and later the H-bomb. Those achievements no one can take from him. Any denial of the Atomic Energy Commission's future secrets may deny the United States more than it denies Dr. Oppenheimer.

We can't forget that it was Albert Einstein, a dedicated international lefty, who first warned President Roosevelt by way of a letter through Dr. Sachs, that there was danger that the Germans might develop an atom bomb and thus win the war. As a result, a committee of scientists was called together to consider the project. Eventually, the group included the foremost nuclear brains of the world—Bethe, Meltner, Szilard, Fermi and so on—many of them thrown out of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy for their left-wing leanings and many considerably more left-wing than Dr. Oppenheimer. Traitors crept in, too. Men like Dr. Fuchs and Dr. Nunn May.

But one cannot avoid the feeling that if at first the United States had applied to all the men whose collective brains made nuclear fission a reality, the same rigorous criteria which have been applied to Dr. Oppenheimer in the present instance, the A-bomb might not have been made at all.

Come to think of it, we wish it hadn't.

100-17828-A-4

NOT RECORDED
191 AUG 10 1954

Right
CLIPPING FROM THE

N. Y. N.Y. WORLD-TELEGRAM & SUN
 5 AUG 2 1954
 FORWARDED BY N. Y. DIVISION

The Problem of Security

THE DECISION OF THE PANEL in the Oppenheimer case will be praised or attacked, as such things are. Already Dr. Oppenheimer's counsel has taken the position that the decision itself is inconsistent in the sense that while it grants that his loyalty is not impugned, security availability is denied him.

There is no inconsistency in that.

It must be assumed that most Americans are loyal to their country. Otherwise, we should already be a conquered nation. Loyalty can be as much a habit as an act of will.

Security is a very complicated process. A blabbermouth who salutes the flag ardently, who would give his life for his country, who hates its enemies, may be refused security clearance not because he is disloyal but because he is psychologically so constituted that he must tell everything that he knows and he tells it to the wrong people at the wrong time.

A homosexual may be a loyal citizen, but he ought not to have security clearance because he is subject to blackmail. A drunkard or an alcoholic may be a fervent warrior for his native land, but he ought not to have security clearance because no one can tell what he will do or say when he is in his cups.

Men married to Communist women or vice versa, or those who constantly associate with Communists; men or women who, while not themselves Marxists or Communists, have an affinity for those who are Marxists or Communists, who like to be in their company, who are stimulated by their conversation and ideas, are not good security risks because birds of a feather flock together.



Dr. Oppenheimer

IN A WORD, when it comes to security, the decision must be made not on a basis of abstract justice but strictly in favor of the United States.

This means that many loyal Americans must be excluded from security positions and security information not because they are disloyal but for psychological and social reasons.

The case of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer is particularly a peculiar one because he is one of the three or four top men who were responsible for the production of the atom bomb. His scientific attainments are of the highest order. His genius in his own field is unquestioned.

What motivated the panel investigation of Dr. Oppenheimer undoubtedly was his conduct in relationship to the hydrogen bomb, the development of which he opposed and an agitation against which a number of scientists, under his leadership, supported.

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

100-1700-A-39
NOT RECORDED
191 AUG 10 1954

Wash. Post and Times Herald _____
Wash. News _____
Wash. Star _____
N. Y. Herald Tribune _____
N. Y. Mirror _____

25

55 AUG 12 1954

Date: JUN 3 1954

In the broadest sense, this involves moral attitudes as well as political maturity. Many scientists were shocked at the consequences of the atom bomb. They suffered a guilt complex. They felt that they had partaken in mass murder. They tried to establish an atmosphere of opposition to the further use of the bomb as a weapon of war.

Up to a point, it could be assumed that these men were motivated by the most profound moral considerations. After it was discovered that Dr. Klaus Fuchs had stolen the atom bomb, that the Rosenberg-Greenglass, etc., ring had placed an apparatus in Los Alamos; that Russia actually possessed the atom bomb as a result of this espionage and theft—then it ceased to be possible that these scientists were basing their postulates upon morality. The politics of the agitation became clear, and the public assumed that for some reason these men who gave every evidence of being loyal Americans in some matters favored Soviet Russia.

THIS THEN RAISES a very mixed and confused area of opinion and judgment. At what point of human responsibility must a man subordinate his private conscience to his public position?

In our country, a man can always resign from a public position. There is no compulsion for him to hold any public position. It may be advantageous to him, but no man can be forced to accept or hold a public position against his will and against his conscience. His alternative is to resign and to state why.

These are the basic principles involved in the Oppenheimer situation. No allegation as to his loyalty is made; no attack on his faithfulness is made. His judgment is impugned and therefore he is declared to be a security risk. He has the right to appeal this decision, but he cannot alter principles of public employment, which are that Congress determines the policy of the United States, not the private conscience of each individual.

FILE DESCRIPTION

BUREAU FILE

SUBJECT J. R. Oppenheimer

FILE NO. 100-17828 Sub-A

SECTION NO. 7

SERIALS 1

THRU

64

File No: 100-17828Re: J.R. OppenheimerDate: 2/78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3)(C))
			Actual	Released	
1	6-4-54	NEWS Clipping N.Y. TIMES	1	0	Outside the "R" case
2	6-4-54	WASH. POST AND NEWS Clipping TIMES HERALD	2	0	"
3	6-4-54	WASH. POST AND NEWS Clipping TIMES HERALD	1	0	"
4	6-4-54	NEWS Clipping WASH. NEWS	1	0	"
5	6-4-54	NEWS Clipping N.Y. Brooklyn Eagle	1	0	"
6	6-4-54	NEWS Clipping WASH. STAR	1	0	"
7	6-4-54	WASH. POST AND NEWS Clipping TIMES HERALD	1	0	"
8	6-4-54	NEWS Clipping WASH. STAR	1	0	"
9	6-4-54	WASH. STAR AND NEWS Clipping TIMES HERALD	1	0	"
10	6-4-54	NEWS Clipping WASH. STAR	1	0	"
11	6-4-54	" " WASH. POST AND TIMES HERALD	1	0	"
12	6-4-54	" " N.Y. MIRROR	1	0	"

File No: 100-17828

Re: J.R. Oppenheimer

Date:

2/78

(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3)(C))
			Actual	Released	
13	6-4-54	BALTIMORE NEWS Clipping MORNING SUN	1	0	outside the "R" case
14	8-10-54	" " WASHINGTON CITY NEWS SERVICE	1	0	"
15	6-4-54	" " N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE	1	0	"
16	8-10-54	" " WASHINGTON CITY NEWS SERVICE	1	0	"
17	6-5-54	" " WASH. POST AND TIMES HERALD	1	0	"
18	8-10-54	" " WASHINGTON CITY NEWS SERVICE	1	0	"
19	8-10-54	" " " "	1	0	"
20	6-6-54	" " WASH. STAR	3	0	"
21	6-6-54	" " " "	2	0	"
22	6-6-54	" " WASH. POST AND TIMES HERALD	1	0	"
23	6-6-54	" " WASH. STAR	1	0	"
24	8-11-54	" " WASHINGTON CITY NEWS SERVICE	1	0	"

VOLUME 7

HEADQUARTERS FILES

REVIEWED BY sur/952

SUBA

File No: 100-17828Re: J.R. OppenheimerDate: 2/78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
25	6-6-54	News clipping THE WORKER	1	0	outside the "R" law
26	6-7-54	" " WASH. STAR	1	0	"
27	8-11-54	" " WASHINGTON CITY NEWS SERVICE	1	0	"
28	8-11-54	" " "	1	0	"
29	8-11-54	" " "	1	0	"
30	8-11-54	" " "	1	0	"
31	8-11-54	" " "	1	0	"
32	6-7-54	" " WASH. NEWS	1	0	"
33	6-7-54	" " WASH. POST AND TIMES HERALD	1	0	"
34	6-7-54	" " WASH. NEWS	1	0	"
35	6-7-54	" " WASH. POST AND TIMES HERALD	1	0	"
36	6-7-54	" " N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE	2	0	"

File No: 100-17828Re: J. R. OppenheimerDate 2/78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
37	6-7-54	WASH. POST AND NEWS CLIPPING TIMES HERALD	2	0	outside "R" case
38	6-7-54	" " "	2	0	"
39	6-7-54	" " "	1	0	"
40	6-7-54	WASH. NEWS " " WASH. POST AND TIMES HERALD	2	0	"
41	6-7-54	" " " " N.Y. MIRROR	1	0	"
42	6-7-54	" " " " WASH. STAR	2	0	"
43	6-7-54	" " " " WASH. POST AND TIMES HERALD	1	0	"
44	6-7-54	" " " " CHICAGO SUN-TIMES	2	0	"
45	6-7-54	" " " " WASH. STAR	1	0	"
46	6-8-54	" " " " WASH. POST AND TIMES HERALD	2	0	"
47	6-8-54	" " " " WASH. STAR	1	0	"
48	6-8-54	" " " " "	1	0	"

File No: 100-17828Re: J. R. OppenheimerDate: 2/78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
49	6-8-54	NEWS clipping N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE	1	0	outside R case
50	6-8-54	" " "	2	0	"
51	6-8-54	" " " Fi	2	0	"
52	6-8-54	" " WASH. POST AND TIMES HERALD	1	0	"
53	6-8-54	" " WASH. NEWS	1	0	"
54	6-8-54	" " WASH. STAR	1	0	"
55	6-8-54	" " CHICAGO TRIBUNE	2	0	"
56	6-8-54	" " WASH. STAR	1	0	"
57	6-8-54	" " N.Y. JOURNAL AMERICAN	2	9	"
58	6-9-54	" " WASH. STAR	1	0	"
59	8-11-54	" " WASHINGTON CITY NEWS SERVICE	1	0	"
60	6-9-54	" " CHICAGO SUN-TIMES	1	0	"

Re: J. R. Oppenheimer

Date: _____ (month/year)

POLYMER


U. S. Department of Justice

(MATERIAL MUST NOT BE REMOVED FROM OR ADDED TO THIS FILE)

FEDERAL BUREAU

of

INVESTIGATION



USE CARE IN HANDLING THIS FILE

Transfer-Call 421

17828 SUB A

SECTION 7

JUNE 4 1951 - JUNE 30 1951

FILE DESCRIPTION

BUREAU FILE

SUBJECT J. Robert
Oppenheimer

FILE NO. 100-17828A

SECTION NO. 8

SERIALS A1

thru

A59

File No: 100-17828ARe: J. Robert OppenheimerDate: 2/28
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
1	6/10/54	CLIPPING FROM THE EVENING BULLETIN	2	0	OUTSIDE THE ROSENBERG CASE
2	6/10/54	" WASH. STAR "	1	0	" "
3	6/10/54	" CI AMERICAN "	2	0	" "
4	6/10/54	" SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER "	1	0	" "
5	6/11/54	" WASH. POST & TIMES HERALD "	1	0	" "
6	6/11/54	" " "	2	0	" "
7	6/11/54	" DAILY MAIL "	1	0	" "
8	6/11/54	" WASH STAR "	1	0	" "
9	6/11/54	" AQ JOURNAL "	1	0	" "
10	6/12/54	" NY HERALD TRIBUNE "	1	0	" "
11	6/13/54	" WASH STAR "	1	0	" "
12	6/13/54	" WASH. POST AND TIMES HERALD "	1	0	" "

File No: 100-17828ARe: J. Robert OppenheimerDate: 2/78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
13	6/13/54	CLIPPING FROM NY POST	1	0	OUTSIDE the ROSENBERG CASE
14	6/14/54	" WASH POST & TIME HERALD	1	0	" "
15	6/14/54	" WASH STAR	1	0	" "
16	6/14/54	" WASH. POST & TIME HERALD	1	0	" "
17	6/14/54	" NY HERALD TRIBUNE	1	0	" "
18	6/14/54	" WASH POST AND TIMES HER.	1	0	" "
19	6/14/54	" OREGON JOURNAL	1	0	OUTSIDE the Rosenberg Case
20	6/14/54	" WASH. STAR	1	0	" "
21	6/14/54	" WASH. CITY NEWS SERVICE	1	0	" "
22	6/14/54	" WASH. POST & TIMES HERALD	1	0	" "
22		COPY OF ABOVE	1	0	" "
23	6/15/54	" WASH. POST & TIMES HERALD	1	0	" "

Re: J. Robert Oppenheimer

Date: 2/18
(month/year)

701/00.

File No: 100-17823ARe: J. Robert OPPENHEIMERDate: 2/78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
36	6/15/54	CLIPPING FROM WASH. CITY NEWS SERVICE	1	0	outside the Rosenberg Case
37	6/15/54	" " " "	1	0	" "
38	6/15/54	" " " "	1	0	" "
39	6/15/54	" " " "	1	0	" "
40	6/15/54	" " " "	1	0	" "
41	6/15/54	" " " "	2	0	" "
42	6/15/54	" " " "	1	0	" "
43	6/15/54	" " " "	1	0	" "
44	6/15/54	" " " "	1	0	" "
45	6/15/54	" " " "	1	0	" "
46	6/15/54	" " " "	1	0	" "
47	6/16/54	CLIPPING FROM WASH POST & TIMES HERALD	3	0	" "

File No: 100-17828ARe: J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMERDate: 2/78

(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
48	6/16/54	CLIPPING FROM WASA CITY NEWS SERVICE	1	0	outside the Rosenberg case
49	6/16/54	" " " "	1	0	" "
50	6/16/54	" " " "	1	0	" "
51	6/16/54	" " " "	1	0	" "
52	6/16/54	" " " " WASH. POST & TIMES HERALD	1	0	" "
53	6/16/54	" " " " WASH. STAR	13	0	" "
54	6/16/54	" " " " WASH. STAR	5	0	" "
55	6/16/54	" " " " WASH. NEWS	3	0	" "
56	6/16/54	" " " " N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE	2	0	" "
57	6/16/54	" " " " WASH. NEWS	1	0	" "
58	6/16/54	" " " " WASH. CITY NEWS SERVICE	3	0	" "
59	6/16/54	" " " " WASH. STAR	3	0	" "

INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Urey Assails Calling Oppenheimer a Risk

CHICAGO, June 13 (INS).—Dr. Harold C. Urey today attacked the "security risk" labeling of atomic physicist Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer and charged it was based on a "false premise that the nation is infiltrated with subversives."

Urey, a Nobel prize-winning chemist and, like Oppenheimer, an atomic bomb pioneer, said the decision also was based on an "illusion about secrecy." He said:

"These charges against Oppenheimer should never have been brought. They rest on the false premise that the United States is infiltrated with a large number of subversives."

"There is also the question of security and the illusion about secrecy. There can be no such thing as absolute secrecy in connection with the atomic and hydrogen bombs."

"The Russians have scientists who know the facts."

Urey made his statement during an appearance on the University of Chicago Round Table, carried over the National Broadcasting Company network.

Oppenheimer was denied access to Atomic Energy Commission security data and a special three-man AEC board upheld his suspension as a "security risk" and refused to reinstate him by a 2-to-1 vote.

Urey said: "I believe Oppenheimer is loyal. Calling him a security risk doesn't make the country more secure."

"I thought he was wrong in opposing the development on the hydrogen bomb and said so at the time."

"But it doesn't make you a security risk if you make a mistake. The proper penalty for giving the Government bad advice is not to be asked for advice again."

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

18

NOT RECORDED
191 AUG 10 1954

Wash. Post and Times Herald 6
Wash. News _____
Wash. Star _____
N. Y. Herald Tribune _____
N. Y. Mirror _____

Date:

FILE DESCRIPTION

BUREAU FILE

SUBJECT J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER

FILE NO. 100-17828-A

SECTION NO. 9

SERIALS JUNE 17, 1954 (1)

THROUGH
JUNE 29, 1954 (65)

File No: 100-17828-A

Re: J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER

Date:

2/78

(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
1	6/17/54	WASH POST	1	0	Outside the "R" CASE
2	6/17/54	CH. SUN - TIMES	3	0	" " " "
3	6/17/54	N.Y. HERALD TRIB,	1	0	" " " "
4	6/17/54	WASH. NEWS with Routing Slip	1	0	" " " "
5	6/17/54	Pittsburgh Post-Gazette	2	0	" " " "
6	6/17/54	WASH POST	1	0	" " " "
7	6/17/54	WASH. STAR	1	0	" " " "
8	6/17/54	N.Y. Herald TRIB,	1	0	" " " "
9	6/17/54	WASH. POST	2	0	" " " "
10	6/17/54	WASH. POST	3	0	" " " "
11	6/17/54	WASH. NEWS	1	0	" " " "
12	6/17/54	N.Y. MIRROR	1	0	" " " "

File No: 100-17828-A

Re: J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER

Date:

2/78

(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
13	6/17/54	N.Y. HER. TRIB.	8	0	Outside the "R" CASE
14	6/17/54	WASH. STAR	1	0	" " " "
15	6/17/54	WASH. STAR	2	0	" " " "
16	6/17/54	WASH. STAR	2	0	" " " "
17	6/18/54	WASH. POST	1	0	" " " "
18	6/18/54	WASH. STAR	2	0	" " " "
19	6/18/54	NY POST	2	0	" " " "
20	6/18/54	DETROIT TIMES	2	2	
21	6/18/54	WASH. NEWS	1	0	Outside the "R" CASE
22	6/18/54	WASH. POST	1	0	" " " "
23	6/18/54	WASH. STAR	1	0	" " " "
24	6/19/54	WASH. POST	1	0	" " " "

File No: 100-17828-A

Re: J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER

Date:

2/78

(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
25	6/19/53	WASH. POST	1	0	outside the "R" Case
26	6/19/54	NY. MIRROR	1	0	" " " "
27	6/19/54	OMAHA WRD-HRCD	1	0	" " " "
28	6/20/54	PH. EVE. BUL.	1	0	" " " "
29	6/20/54	WASH. POST.	1	0	" " " "
30	6/21/54	WASH. POST.	2	0	" " " "
31	6/21/54	WCNS	1	0	" " " "
32	6/21/54	NY. HER. TRIB	2	0	" " " "
33	6/21/54	FT. WAYNE NEWS-SENT.	1	1	
34	6/21/54	WASH. STAR	2	0	outside the "R" Case
35	6/21/54	WASH. STAR	1	0	" " " "
36	6/22/54	NY. HER. TRIB.	1	0	" " " "

File No: 100-17828-ARe: J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMERDate: 2/78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
37	6/22/54	WCNS	1	0	Outside, the "R" Case
38	6/22/54	WCNS	1	0	" " " "
39	6/24/54	WASH. STAR	1	0	" " " "
40	6/22/54	CHGO DLY NWS	1	0	" " " "
41	6/22/54	WASH. POST	1	0	" " " "
42	6/23/54	WASH. STAR	1	0	" " " "
43	6/23/54	WCNS	1	0	" " " "
44	6/23/54	N.Y. HER. TRIB,	1	0	" " " "
45	6/23/54	WASH. POST	1	0	" " " "
46	6/23/54	N.Y. HER. TRIB,	1	0	" " " "
47	6/23/54	WASH. STAR	1	0	" " " "
48	6/23/54	WASH. POST	1	0	" " " "

File No: 100-17828-ARe: J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMERDate: 2/78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
49	6/24/54	N.Y. HER. TRIB.	2	0	Outside the "R" Case
50	6/24/54	WASH. STAR	1	0	" " " "
51	6/24/54	BOSTON TRAVELER	1	0	" " " "
52	6/25/54	BOSTON RECORD	1	0	" " " "
53	6/25/54	WCNS	1	0	" " " "
54	6/28/54	WASH. NEWS	1	0	" " " "
55	6/28/54	WASH. POST	1	0	" " " "
56	6/28/54	WASH. POST	1	0	" " " "
57	6/29/54	WCNS	1	0	" " " "
58	6/29/54	WCNS	1	0	" " " "
59	6/29/54	WCNS	1	0	" " " "
60	6/29/54	WASH. POST	1	0	" " " "

File No: 100-17828-A

Re: J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER

Date: 2/78
(month/year)

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
U. S. Department of Justice

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FEDERAL BUREAU

of

INVESTIGATION



USE CARE IN HANDLING THIS FILE

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17828 SUB A

SECTION 9

JUNE 17, 1954-JUNE 29, 19

Who Should Investigate?

THE secret investigation of J. Robert Oppenheimer will not satisfy the American people. In a matter involving the lives of all of us, there should be no secrecy.

The national defense is in no way involved. The Russians have the hydrogen bomb and we are now told they had it ahead of us due to a conflict within our government as to whether we should make a hydrogen bomb or not. Oppenheimer was opposed to making it.

The Atomic Energy Commission has designated a panel to investigate Oppenheimer. While that panel is in secret session, Oppenheimer supplied two newspapers with his side of the story. The data provided by the FBI, which the department of justice gave to the President and which caused Oppenheimer to be suspended from all official duties and relationships, have not been made public, which it could not be under the law.

THIS raises the question as to whether a board appointed by the AEC is the suitable body to make such an investigation. After all, the AEC itself is on the spot.

It had a report on the subject of Oppenheimer some time in 1947. In 1949, his brother, Frank Oppenheimer, also employed on atomic matters, was disclosed as a Communist party member by the House committee on un-American activities. Both Oppenheimers were married to Communists.

J. Robert Oppenheimer gave employment to known and public Communists. What did the AEC do about it? We are told the question was raised several times and that each time Oppenheimer was cleared.

About a year ago, the McCarthy committee of the Senate began to investigate Communist infiltration into the AEC. Its new chairman, Lewis Strauss, requested delay until he cleared up any mess that existed, but Strauss was a member of the AEC from 1946 to 1950 and he must have known about Oppenheimer.

THEREFORE what needs to be investigated is not J. Robert

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Mohr
Miss Gandy

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

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Oppenheimer alone but the AEC. It needs to be recalled that from 1942 to 1947 the FBI was excluded from all investigative or screening activities in connection with atomic fission. The FBI was only called in after it was established the atom bomb had been stolen.

The Oppenheimer case is only one in this most secret agency of government. Dr. Klaus Fuchs worked for it. Dr. Allan Nunn May worked for it. Dr. Raymond Boyer worked for it. These are convicted spies.

Julius Rosenberg was able to invade it when most Americans never had heard of the Manhattan Project at Los Alamos.

WE DO NOT know to this day who let Rosenberg operate in Los Alamos. We do not know exactly how he managed to do his work there so effectively.

We have an inkling from the McCarthy committee hearings but not the full story. That is what needs to be investigated thoroughly and in public. There is no longer any excuse for secrecy.

Only a congressional committee, with adequate powers of subpoena, can do this job. No agency of government can investigate itself any more than a man can try himself for murder.

President Truman ordered production of the hydrogen bomb on Jan. 31, 1950, a considerable period, as we now know, after the Russians started on this work and long after the science of the bomb was known.

DETROIT TIMES

DATE.....

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PAGE....COLU.M....

FBI Could Not Reveal Oppenheimer Story

Another striking example of how the FBI, despite its admitted excellent investigative prowess, cannot, on its own initiative, make public any of its findings is revealed in the disclosure of the voluminous record of the four week-long loyalty board hearings in the Dr. E. Robert Oppenheimer case.

In this, as in all other cases, the FBI could only investigate but not announce any of its information, findings, and they would have continued to remain hidden in the FBI files had not the Atomic Energy Committee Loyalty Board decided to make the entire record in the case public.

Particularly affecting the FBI in the context of the transcript is a letter sent to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover Nov. 7, 1953, by William L. Borden, Executive Director of the staff of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy from January 1, 1949, to June, 1953.

Before serving under the late Senator McMahon, Democrat, who was chairman of the committee, Borden, graduate of the Yale Law College, was a pilot in the U.S. Army Air Corps for three years, serving overseas.

Addressing Mr. Hoover, Borden declared that "the purpose of this letter is to state my own exhaustively considered opinion based upon years of study of the available classified evidence that more probably than not J. Robert Oppenheimer is an agent of the Soviet Union. This opinion considers the following factors among others:

He was contributing substantial monthly sums to the Communist Party; his ties with Communism survived the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the Soviet attack upon Finland; his wife and younger brother were Communists; he had no

close friends except Communists; he had at least one Communist mistress; he belonged only to Communist organizations, apart from professional affiliations; the people whom he recruited into the early wartime Berkeley Atomic Project were exclusively Communists; he had been instrumental in securing recruits for the Communist Party; and he was in frequent contact with Soviet agents.

Mr. Borden also charges that Dr. Oppenheimer was a staunch supporter of the H-Bomb program until World War II ended and that he then urged each senior individual in his field to desist and was remarkably instrumental in influencing the military authorities and the Atomic Energy Commission essentially to suspend H-Bomb development from the middle of 1946 through January, 1950.

Borden further maintains that Oppenheimer, more probably than not, has since mid-1942, acted under a Soviet directive influencing United States military, atomic energy, intelligence and diplomatic policy, and that it is to be noted that these conclusions correlate with information furnished by Klaus Fuchs indicating that the Soviets had acquired an agent in Berkeley, who informed them about electro-magnetic separation research during 1942 and earlier.

Had Mr. Borden presented his information before a Congressional investigating committee, it of course would have immediately been made public and the power of public opinion would have impelled prompt action.

This is just another example of why the FBI cannot take the place of the Congressional committees as the best and speediest means for exposing Communist subversiveness.

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Boardman _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Parsons _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tamm _____
Mr. Sizoo _____
Mr. Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____

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100-17828-A
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Fale

Editorial
Fort Wayne News-Sentinel
June 21, 1954
Clifford P. Ward, editor

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JUN 23 1954
FBI - INDIANAPOLIS

Forwarded by Indianapolis Div.
SEP 14 1954 124

FILE DESCRIPTION

BUREAU FILE

SUBJECT JULIUS ROBERT OPPENHEIMER

FILE NO. 100-17828 SUB A

SECTION NO. 10

SERIALS 1

THROUGH

27

File No: 100-13828 SUBA

Re: JAMES ROBERT OPPENHEIMER

Date: 2-78

(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
1	6-30-54	NY HERALD TRIBUNE NEWSPAPER CLIPPING	15	-	outside the "R" Case
2	6-30-54	WASH. STAR NEWS CLIP	11	-	" " " "
3	6-30-54	NY MIRROR NEWS CLIPPING	1	-	" " " "
4	6-30-54	WASH. STAR NEWS CLIP	1	-	" " " "
5	6-30-54	NY TIMES NEWS CLIP	2	-	" " " "
6	6-30-54	NY POST NEWS CLIP	1	-	" " " "
7	6-30-54	NEWARK EVENING NEWS NEWS CLIP	2	-	" " " "
8	6-30-54	WASH. POST & TIMES HERALD NEWS CLIP	1	-	" " " "
9	6-30-54	WASH. STAR NEWS CLIP	1	-	" " " "
10	6-30-54	WASH. STAR NEWS CLIP	3	-	" " " "
11	6-30-54	WASH. NEWS NEWS CLIP	1	-	" " " "
12	6-30-54	WASH. CITY NEWS SERVICE NEWS CLIP	1	-	" " " "

Date: 8-28
(month/year)

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SECTION 10
JUNE 30, 1954 ONLY

FILE DESCRIPTION

BUREAU FILE

SUBJECT J. ROBERT OPPENHEIM

FILE NO. 100-17828 SUB A

SECTION NO. 11

SERIALS

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7/9/54 (59)

File No: 100-17828Re: J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMERREVIEWED BY JTGDate: 3/78
(month/year)

SUB A

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
A1	7/1/54	NEWSPAPER CLIPPING WASHINGTON STAR	1	0	OUTSIDE THE "R" CASE
A2	7/1/54	WASHINGTON POST & TIMES HERALD	3	0	
A3	7/1/54	NY TIMES	2	0	
A4	7/1/54	PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER	1	0	
A5	7/1/54	NY HERALD TRIBUNE	1		
A6	7/1/54	NY TIMES	1	0	
A7	7/1/54	NY HERALD TRIBUNE	1	0	
A8	7/1/54	WASH. POST & TIMES HERALD	2	0	
A9	7/1/54	NY HERALD TRIBUNE	1	0	
A10	7/1/54	NEWARK STAR LEDGER	1	0	
A11	7/1/54	UPI RELEASE	1	0	
A12	7/1/54	NEWARK STAR LEDGER	1	0	

File No: 100-17828Re: J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMERREVIEWED BY JTDate: 3/78
(month/year)SUB A

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
A13	7/1/54	NY TIMES	1	0	OUTSIDE THE "R" CASE
A14	7/1/54	NEWARK EVENING NEWS	1	0	
A15	7/1/54	NY BROOKLYN EAGLE	1	0	
A16	7/1/54	NY JOURNAL AMERICAN	2	0	
A17	7/1/54	NY BROOKLYN EAGLE	2	0	
A18	7/1/54	CHICAGO AMERICAN	2	0	
A19	7/1/54	NY POST	2	0	
A20	7/1/54	NY POST	2	0	
A21	7/1/54	NY MIRROR	2	0	
A22	7/1/54	NEWARK EVENING NEWS	1	0	
A23	7/2/54	NY POST	2	0	
A24	7/2/54	CHICAGO SUN-TIME S	1	0	

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Date

(month/year)

File No:

100-17828

Re:

J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER

SUB A

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
A25	7/2/54	WASH. POST AND TIMES HERALD	1	0	OUTSIDE THE "R" CASE
A26	7/2/54	SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER	1	0	
A27	7/1/54	THE NEW MEXICAN	1	0	
A28	7/3/54	THE WORKER	1	0	
A29	7/1/54	THE NEW MEXICAN	1	0	
A30	6/30/54	THE NEW MEXICAN	2	0	
A31	7/3/54	THE TIMES RECORD TROV, NY	1	0	
A32	7/3/54	WASH. STAR	1	0	
A33	7/1/54	THE NEW MEXICAN	1	0	
A34	7/3/54	WASH POST AND TIMES HERALD	1	0	
A35	6/30/54	THE NEW MEXICAN	1	0	
A36	7/4/54	WASH STAR	2	0	

INVENTORIED BY JTFile No: 100-17828SUB ARe: J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMERREVIEWED BY JTDate: 3/78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
A37	7/4/54	WASH POST AND TIMES HERALD	1	0	OUTSIDE THE "R" CASE
A38	7/4/54	SUNDAY STAR LEDGER	2	0	
A39	7/5/54	WASH STAR	1	0	
A40	7/5/54	WASH. POST AND TIMES HERALD	1	0	
A41	7/5/54	UPI RELEASE	2	0	
A42	7/5/54	NY HERALD TRIBUNE	1	0	
A43	7/6/54	UPI RELEASE	1	0	
A44	7/6/54	NY HERALD TRIBUNE	1	0	
A45	7/6/54	NY WORLD TELEGRAM AND SUN	1	0	
A46	7/6/54	WASH STAR	1	0	
A47	7/6/54	NY MIRROR	1	0	
A48	7/6/54	WASH NEWS	1	0	

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Date:

3/78
(month/year)

File No: 100-17828

SUB A

Re:

J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
A49	7/6/54	WASH. POST AND TIMES HERALD	2	0	OUTSIDE THE "R" CASE
A50	7/7/54	NY POST	1	0	
A51	7/7/54	WASH. POST AND TIMES HERALD	2	0	
A52	7/7/54	WASH STAR	1	0	
A53	7/7/54	WASH POST AND TIMES HERALD	1	0	
A54	7/8/54	NY HERALD TRIBUNE	1	0	
A55	7/9/54	WASH NEWS	1	0	
A56	7/9/54	WASH STAR	1	0	
A57	7/9/54	WASH POST AND TIMES HERALD	1	0	
A58	7/9/54	NY POST	1	0	
A59	7/9/54	WASH POST AND TIMES HERALD	1	0	

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BUREAU FILE

SUBJECT Oppenheimer

FILE NO. 100-17828 Sub A

SECTION NO. 12

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3-6-55

SERIALS 1

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File No: 100-17828Re: Robert OppenheimerREVIEWED BY [Signature]Date: 3/78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
0-17828-1	1/12/54	Clipping from Wash. Post Time Herald	1	0	Outside the "R" case
-2	1/12/54	Clipping from Wash. News Clipping from Wash. Post	1	0	"
-3	1/14/54	Times Herald Clipping from N.Y. Herald	1	0	"
-4	1/15/54	Tribune	1	0	"
-5	1/16/54	Clipping from Wash. News	1	0	"
-6	1/19/54	Clipping from New Leader Clipping from N.Y. Journal	1	0	"
-7	1/20/54	American Clipping from Newark Star	1	0	"
-8	1/11/54	Ledger	1	0	"
-9	1/11/54	Clipping from Wash. Star Clipping from Wash. Post	1	0	"
-10	1/25/54	and Time Herald Clipping from N.Y. Herald	12	12	
-11	1/29/54	Tribune	1	0	Outside the "R" case
-12	1/17/54	Clipping from Wash. Star	1	0	"

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File No: 100-17828Re: Robert Oppenheimer

REVIEWED BY _____

Date: 3/78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
0-17828-13	8/20/54	Clipping from Wash. Star	1	0	"
-14	8/25/54	Clipping from Wash. Star	1	0	"
		Clipping from N.Y. Herald Tribune			"
-15	8/26/54		2	0	"
		Clipping from Wash. Post and Times Herald			"
-16	8/26/54		1	0	"
		Clipping from N.Y. World			"
-17	8/30/54	Telegram & Sun	1	0	"
		Clipping from N.Y. Times			"
-18	8/30/54		1	0	"
					"
-19	8/30/54	Clipping from N.Y. News	1	0	"
		Clipping from Boston Evening			"
"	8/30				"
-20	8/30/54	American	1	0	"
					"
-21	8/30/54	Clipping from Wash. Star	1	0	"
					"
-22	8/30/54	Clipping from Detroit Times	1	0	"
					"
-23	8/30/54	Clipping from Miami Herald	1	0	"
					"
-24	8/30/54	Clipping from Wash. News	2	0	"

File No: 100-17828Re: Robert Oppenheimer

REVIEWED BY _____

Date: 2/78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
		Clipping from WASH. POST			
-17828-25	8/31/54	and Times Herald Wash. City News Service	1	0	"
-26	9/10/54	Teletype WENS Clipping from Daily Worker	1	0	"
-27	9/16/54		1	0	"
-28	9/21/54	Clipping from Wash. Star	1	0	"
-29	9/21/54	Clipping from N.Y. News	1	0	"
-30	10/1/54	Clipping from N.Y. Herald Tribune	2	0	"
-31	10/1/54	Clipping from Boston Daily Globe	1	0	"
-32	10/1/54	Clipping from Brooklyn Eagle	1	0	"
-33	10/2/54	Wash. City News Service teletype	1	0	"
-34	10/2/54	Wash. City News Service teletype	1	0	"
-35	10/2/54	Clipping from N.Y. Times	2	0	"
-36	10/2/54	Clipping from New York Evening News	1	0	"

File No: DD-17826Re: Robert Oppenheimer

REVIEWED BY _____

Date: 3/78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
DD-17826-37	10/14/54	Clipping from Evening Bulletin	1	0	"
38	10/14/54	Clipping from Brooklyn Eagle Clipping from The Bergen	1	0	"
39	10/15/54	Evening Record Clipping from The Wash. Post and	1	0	"
40	10/15/54	Times Herald	1	0	"
41	10/22/54	Clipping from Newark Evening News Clipping from The Wash. Post	1	0	"
42	10/22/54	and Times Herald	1	0	"
43	10/23/54	Wash. City News Service teletype	1	0	"
44	10/24/54	Clipping from Wash. Star	1	0	"
45	11/3/54	Clipping from N.Y. Herald Tribune	1	0	"
46	11/3/54	Clipping from Wash. Star	1	0	"
47	11/6/54	Clipping from Newark Evening News	1	0	"
48	11/7/54	Clipping from The Worker	1	0	"

INVENTORIED BY edmg/gsrFile No 100-17828Re: Robert Oppenheimer

REVIEWED BY _____

Date: 3/78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
0-17828-49	11/1/54	Wash City News Service teletype	1	0	"
50	11/1/54	Washington news	1	0	"
51	11/1/54	Wash City News Service teletype	1	0	"
52	12/1/54	Wash City News Service teletype	1	0	"
53	12/1/54	Wash Post and Times Herald	1	0	"
54	12/2/54	Wash City News Service teletype	1	0	"
55	12/2/54	The Miami Herald	1	0	"
"	12/2/54	N.Y. Mirror	1	0	"
57	12/2/54	N.Y. Herald Tribune	1	0	"
58	12/2/54	Washington Star	1	0	"
59	12/2/54	Washington news	1	0	"
60	12/2/54	Wash Post and Times Herald	1	0	"

File No: 100-17626Re: Robert Oppenheimer

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Date: 378
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)	
			Actual	Released		
100-17626-14	12/20/54	N.Y. Times	1	0	"	
62	12/20/54	N.Y. Herald Tribune	1	0	"	
63	12/20/54	Wash. City News Service teletype	1	0	"	
64	12/20/54	Wash. City News Service teletype	1	0	"	
65	12/1/55	N.Y. Times	3	0	Not within time frame	
66	1/4/55	Wash. City News Service teletype	1	0	"	
67	1/5/55	Wash. Post and Times Herald	1	0	"	
"	68	1/5/55	The Wash. Daily News	1	0	"
69	1/5/55	N.Y. Times	1	0	"	
70	1/6/55	Washington Star	2	0	"	
71	1/7/55	N.Y. Herald Tribune	1	0	"	
72	1/16/55	N.Y. Times	1	6	"	

File No: 100-17828Re: Robert OppenheimerREVIEWED BY JSRDate: 3/77
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Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
1828-73	11/9/55	N.Y. Times	1	0	"
74	11/9/55	Wash. City News Service teletype	1	0	"
75	11/6/55	Washington News	1	0	"
76	11/7/55	N.Y. Times	1	0	"
77	11/7/55	New Leader	1	0	"
78	2/3/55	Wash. City News Service teletype	1	0	"
79	2/8/55	The Manchester Guardian	1	0	"
80	2/14/55	New Leader	1	0	"
81	2/18/55	Wash. Star	1	0	"
82	2/15/55	Wash. Post and Times Herald	1	0	"
83	2/16/55	Washington Star	1	0	"
84	2/18/55	Seattle Times	2	0	"

HEADQUARTERS FILES

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Robert Oppenheimer

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Drama Packs Amazing Oppenheimer Transcript

By Aljted Friendly

Assistant Managing Editor,
The Washington Post and Times Herald

THE Government Printing Office a few weeks ago turned up as the unlikely publisher of the most significant and controversial book of the year.

It is about the length of the Bible, has a plot more intricate than "Gone With the Wind" and has half as many characters as "War and Peace." Depending on your reading speed, it takes from 20 to 30 solid hours to complete.

It reflects on the troubled social and political world about us perhaps more deeply and disturbingly than any other book published during the cold war.

It is a treasure trove for statesmen, moralists, scientists and military intelligence officers on both sides of the Iron Curtain. It is a source book for a generation of historians to come. It is quite possibly the raw material for dozens of future dramatists, novelists and social philosophers.

You can get it, all 693 pages, for \$2.75 from the Superintendent of Documents. Its title is: "In the Matter of J. Robert

Oppenheimer; Transcript of Hearing Before Personnel Security Board."

It is a typographical monstrosity, a prodigious task to read, a frustrating and infuriating document. It is also absorbing, every page of it.

Its drama is Aristotelian, in the sense that the principal figure of the tragedy is a king whose fate illustrates and illumines the life and problems of the spectators, which is to say all of us. The story is that of a towering figure, the father of the atomic bomb, the center if not the founder of the American school of theoretical physics.

The drama is also Shakespearean, in that the central problems are those of motive. As in Shakespearean drama, even after the play ends the audience can argue endlessly about just what the motives were of everyone concerned, the witnesses and the judges certainly as much as the judged. The delineation of character, as 40 persons come to testify, is also Shakespearean in its richness and variety.

There is a touch of Eric Ambler, too, in allusions to espionage, although the master of the spy thriller would never have been guilty of concocting such implausible fictions as the suggestions of some of Oppenheimer's detractors.

There is a bit of opera bouffe in the allegation that a mysterious cabal, with the sinister name of ZORC, plotted to siphon off the budget of the Strategic Air Command.

A Tragic Love Story

THERE are a couple of love stories, both pathetic, ill-starred and told with merciful economy.

In one, the subject is Jean Tatlock, Oppenheimer's fiancée, seen searching vainly in communism for some solace or answer to a disturbed quest; shortly before she dies tragically she asks to see Oppenheimer again, because she still loves him.

The second tells of Mrs. Oppenheimer,

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immersed briefly in communism through love of a dashing and romantic Communist first husband. We see her, disillusioned with the party as early as 1936, follow him drearly and wearily to Paris, only to receive word that he died fighting with the Loyalists in Spain.

There is a monumental amount of military and political and technical information in the book, despite the deletions of the security officers who went over the transcript. It contains probably more information on atomic and thermonuclear progress than any single volume since the Smyth Report. It is the basis for a reasonably complete history of the hydrogen bomb, and some scholars and reporters are already at work compiling it.

There is in the book also one or two touches of buffoonery, with Gen. Leslie R. Groves, wartime head of the Manhattan Engineering District and Oppenheimer's boss when the atom bomb was made, playing the role of Falstaff.

The Two-Bomb Guess

GROVES, who is supposed to be testifying about Oppenheimer, gets off at once with the announcement that, before Yalta, he concluded that "we needed only two (atomic) bombs to win the war." With becoming modesty, he notes, "Of course, I also proceeded on the theory that I might be wrong."

He acknowledges that he consulted with Oppenheimer frequently during the life of the atomic bomb project and used him at least on one tough theoretical problem, "not to tell me what to do but to confirm my opinion."

But, Groves concedes, Oppenheimer was most valuable, and "he did a magnificent job as far as the war effort was concerned. In other words, while he was under my control—and you must remember that he left my control shortly after the war was over."

At the outset of Groves' testimony, he was warned by Chairman Gordon Gray of the special Personnel Security Board not to discuss classified matters. Don't worry, Groves replied in effect, "I will watch out for that. I have been watching out for that for so many years I don't think I will slip."

Asterisks in the transcript show that the security officers had to apply their scissors three times to the immediately succeeding 200 or 300 words of Groves' testimony.

50,000-Word Document

WITH supporting documents, such as the decisions, briefs and communications, the Oppenheimer case runs to some 750,000 words. Perhaps 100,000 words bear on a series of minor incidents. These were later made much of in the decisions of the Gray Board and the Atomic Energy Commission, but they are essentially secondary.

Some would see them as not much more than nit-picking. It is impossible to conclude that the case against Oppenheimer rests in any large part upon them. Space does not permit their discussion here.

The central items which constitute the core of the case against Oppenheimer are two. In roughly equal proportions, they occupy the rest of the transcript.

One is the Chevalier episode. The other is the matter of Oppenheimer's views and activities with respect to the thermonuclear bomb (the "superbomb" or the "hydrogen" bomb).

In their majority decision, Gray and Board Member Thomas A. Morgan made much of the thermonuclear bomb item, finding that Oppenheimer delayed its development by opposing it and failing to be properly enthusiastic about it. It was principally this aspect of their report that provoked a storm of criticism and contempt among the Nation's press and other voices of opinion.

When the AEC made its final decision a few days later, the four members ruling against Oppenheimer loudly and vehemently protested that the issue had utterly no bearing on their findings (except for a question of Oppenheimer's candor in his testimony about it). One might gather from their intense disclaimers that the idea never crossed their minds that J. Robert's H-bomb views and actions might have security risk implications.

The Essential Charge

IT may be assumed, however, that those views and actions crossed someone's mind, since the story occupies some 300,000 or 400,000 words of the transcript.

The charge against Oppenheimer on this point in the letter to him from AEC general manager K. D. Nichols was essentially this:

Th From 1945 to 1949 Oppenheimer the hydrogen bomb was feasible and realizable, but that after the Russians exploded their first atomic bomb, Oppenheimer opposed developing the thermonuclear weapon on moral grounds, because it was not feasible, because it was politically undesirable and because there were not enough facilities and skilled scientists to push its development; further, that once it was decided by President Truman to push development of the H-bomb anyway, Oppenheimer continued to oppose the project and did not cooperate fully with national policy.

In a roaring and exciting three pages of the transcript, Dr. Vannevar Bush, the Grand Old Man of American science, told the Gray Board it should have refused to entertain such a charge. He said the board should have sent the letter back to General Nichols for redrafting.

The letter, he said, "is quite capable of being interpreted as placing a man on trial because he held opinions, and had the temerity to express them."

"If this country ever gets to the point where we come that near to the Russian system, we are certainly not in any condition to attempt to lead the free world toward the benefits of democracy."

"I think that in all fairness I ought to tell you my frank feeling that this has gotten into a very bad mess . . . we have been slipping backward in our maintenance of the Bill of Rights . . ."

"I think this board or no board should ever sit on a question in this country of whether a man should serve his country or not because he expressed strong opinions. If you want to try that case, you can try me. I have expressed strong opinions many times, and I intend to do so. They have been unpopular opinions at times. When a man is pilloried for doing that, this country is in a severe state."

Allegation of Treason

GRAY and Morgan apparently did not concur. To do them justice, it may be assumed that, after the charge was made, there were a couple of implications which, if read into it, might properly be the subject of examination. The implications deal with Oppenheimer's acts, not his opinions.

One was that Oppenheimer's activities had sinister and disloyal motivations. The other was that, regardless of motive, Oppenheimer, as a Government servant and consultant, betrayed his trust by deliberately trying to oppose a national policy already decided upon.

There is one direct allegation in the whole hearing that Oppenheimer, who did indeed oppose an all-out effort to make the H-bomb in 1949, did so because he is a Soviet agent. It was made in a letter of November 7, 1953, to J. Edgar Hoover. The letter, distributed by Hoover to top Government officials, kicked off the whole investigation of Oppenheimer.

The author was William L. Borden, former executive director of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. He had access to derogatory information on Oppenheimer in the investigative files of the FBI and other agencies, but presumably had no other sources.

Borden demonstrated himself, to put the most charitable view on the matter, as an incompetent reporter. The evidence against Oppenheimer, which was surely spread in full on the transcript, comes nowhere close to his description of it; the essential conclusions he drew were as baseless as they were false.

His reading of the evidence and his conclusions were given no credence, indeed no mention, by the Gray Board or the AEC in their final reports.

If there was no treasonable motive, the next question was whether Oppenheimer, regardless of motive, did indeed act against the national policy on the H-bomb, once it was adopted in the White House at the end of January, 1950.

There is no evidence whatsoever in the transcript of any positive acts that Oppenheimer took to delay the project once it was approved.

Gray and Morgan, however, went on to argue that since Oppenheimer did not wax publicly enthusiastic when President Truman overruled his recommendation against making the H-bomb, and did not try energetically to encourage scientists to join the H-bomb work at Los Alamos, he delayed the project.

It was this argument of lack of sufficient "enthusiasm" which aroused a storm of criticism from the Nation's press, scientists and public in general. It was the most vulnerable section of the Gray-Morgan Report. The third member of the Board, Dr. Ward V. Evans, who favored restoring Oppenheimer's clearance, put the matter in a nutshell:

"He did not hinder the development of the H-bomb, and there is absolutely nothing in the testimony to show that he did."

Massive Retaliation'

It is not enough for an understanding of the case to say that the AEC, even in ruling against Oppenheimer, rejected in its entirety this portion of the Gray-Morgan decision. The story of the H-bomb remains at the root of the case.

The hearing tells that story:

When the Russians exploded their first A-bomb in September, 1949, American expectations and American military strategy were knocked galley west. The basis of American defense, the atomic monopoly, was destroyed.

One school, which ultimately was victorious, reacted by calling for atomic superiority. It wanted bigger bombs—the H-bomb—and more bombs. Its ideas developed into what is now known as the policy of potential "massive retaliation" as a deterrent to war.

The other school, led by Oppenheimer, felt that this was a totally inadequate answer. Over and over again in his testimony and in that of such men as Vannevar Bush, I. I. Rabi, Hartley Rowe, David Lilienthal, George Kennan and many others, you find this reasoning, as of 1949:

• A decision to make the H-bomb would lead America into believing that that was all it had to do to answer the Russian threat. Yet it is obvious much more needed to be done—in atomic defense, in revising the balance of our forces, in new political, economic and social approaches to the world.

• The H-bomb, if developed, would be vastly more valuable to the Russians, by reason of available targets, than to us. Yet our effort to make it would impel the Russians to do likewise.

• Development of the H-bomb would end the possibility of any future agreement with the Russians on atomic control or disarmament.

The arguments may have been good or bad; they were at least arguable.

There were other reasons behind Oppenheimer's opposition in October,

1949-January, 1950, when he was chairman of the AEC's powerful General Advisory Committee. Militarily, it looked more sensible to build more A-bombs with available facilities. Technically, even if the H-bomb could be made, it would produce a lesser bang for a buck—or for a neutron, which was the limiting factor—than the equivalent number of A-bombs. Also, technically, the possibility of making an H-bomb did not look promising.

General Advisory Committee went along with Oppenheimer virtually unanimously (one member took no position). So did three of the five AEC members, with Gordon Dean and the present chairman, Lewis L. Strauss, dissenting. The military and the Joint Congressional Atomic Committee were almost unanimously in favor of the H-bomb project (a notable exception was Rep. W. Sterling Cole, the present Committee chairman).

If many scientists saw the matter the way Oppenheimer did, some did not. Notably, the brilliant but difficult Edward Teller, who had been working on the thermonuclear problem since 1942—

with such fixity that he was removed from any work connected with World War II during the war—wanted a "crash" program at once. Of like mind was the famed Ernest O. Lawrence, at Berkeley, and the men around him.

The transcript shows an amusing, if weird, episode in this connection. To Lawrence and Dr. Luis W. Alvarez, it never occurred that our construction of the H-bomb would be anything less than automatic after September 23, 1946, when news of "Joe I," the Russian bomb, was announced. Checking with Teller, they dashed off into the most ambitious plans for staff and facilities and decided, all on their own, that, although without experience in the matter, they would build the atomic reactors to produce the neutrons to make the tritium to go into the H-bomb.

They proceeded energetically and blithely on this plan, only to find out when they came to Washington a month or so later that they were the men who brought the bull fiddle to a party at which no one wanted to hear music, much less their bull fiddle. Professionals, not the Berkeley group, were ultimately employed to build the reactors.

Impossible Concept

FOR a good 18 months after the White House decision, it looked as if Oppenheimer's views were even better founded than he knew. The H-bomb appeared increasingly more dubious; indeed, it is virtually certain that what was then contemplated can never be made. But in 1951, Teller came up with a "brilliant" invention or discovery or idea.

The classification officer's censors leave us without knowledge of what it was, but one may guess. In any event, it is clear that the thermonuclear weapon now being made is a very different

See OPPENHEIMER, Page 7, Column 1

'Trial' Leaves Questions Dangling

OPPENHEIMER, From Page 1

thing from the hydrogen bomb which people thought about in 1949.

With Teller's invention, Oppenheimer waxed highly enthusiastic and helped the project along, even by the testimony of Teller, who loses no love for J. Robert. In fact, Oppenheimer himself contributed an idea, "not very ingenious but . . . very useful," embodied in today's H-weapons.

Even so, Oppenheimer continued to insist that the H-bomb was not the whole answer. The hearing shows him fiercely energetic in projects pushing for continental defense, radar warnings and tactical, as well as strategic, use of A-bombs.

Air Force Enmity

IT is here that the transcript makes evident the furious and increasing enmity against Oppenheimer by the Air Force, or in particular, the Strategic Air Command. What Oppenheimer was saying was that war plans based virtually exclusively, on mass retaliation, by H-bombing Russian cities and installations, were not the be-all and end-all.

He wanted, in short, a more versatile, flexible, atomic arsenal. There are hints he was thinking even of atomic weapons to be used against oncoming flights of enemy bombers, and perhaps even atomic antisubmarine defense. But mostly he was insisting on vastly more attention to the tactical use of A-bombs and to continental air defense. The transcript shows that those who opposed him considered that point of view as first cousin to treason.

The transcript shows one active opponent in the person of Gen. Roscoe C. Wilson, former commandant of the Air War College. He testified at the hearings by order of the Air Force. Wilson told how Oppenheimer's "pattern of action" led him to go to the director of Military Intelligence to express "concern."

Some of the "pattern of action" he worried about has fallen to the classification officer's shears. But General Wilson said that one thing which made him worry was "my awareness to the fact that Dr. Oppenheimer was interested in what I call the internationalization of atomic energy, this at a time when the United States had a monopoly."

Origin of 'ZORC'

MOST ACTIVE of all, however, was David T. Griggs, chief scientist for the Air Force, who once admitted to Oppenheimer that he had impugned Oppenheimer's loyalty. Oppenheimer thereupon called him a paranoid, which doubtless did little to win Griggs' favor.

It was Griggs who saw in the Lincoln summer study project in 1952 a plot, engineered by a secret junta, to undercut the Strategic Air Command and deny it the budget it might otherwise obtain. He testified that a Massachusetts Institute of Technology scientist, Jerrold R. Zacharias, wrote the mystic letters ZORC on a blackboard at a scientific meeting, and explained that they stood for Zacharias, Oppenheimer, Rabi and Charles Lauritson, another famous scientist. The implication was that this was a cabal of intriguers who plotted to damage SAC by the summer study.

Zacharias and others denied the story point blank over pages and pages of cross-examination. One may assume that every attempt was made to verify Griggs' account, but no verification appears in the record. Also, there is no explanation of why the cabal was not known as ZORI, with the L for Lauritson instead of the C for Charles. ZORI would have sounded just as sinister as ZORC.

The ZORC story, incidentally, first saw the light of day in a Fortune article in May, 1953. The material for the piece obviously came straight from the office of the late Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff. It was a bitter attack on Oppenheimer, and the first public one by the Air Force.

By that time, Teller's invention had put a new light on the H-bomb, and Oppenheimer was vulnerable by reason of his 1949 recommendation. The heat was on.

Unequivocal Stand

IN HIS separate opinion condemning Oppenheimer, AEC member Thomas E. Murray rejected with devastating argument the Gray-Morgan viewpoint about Oppenheimer's H-bomb position. He insisted that Oppenheimer had every right to oppose the program for moral, political and technical reasons. In passing, however, Murray observed:

"Dr. Oppenheimer advanced technical and political reasons for his attitude to the hydrogen bomb program. In both respects he has been proved wrong; nothing further need be said."

Oppenheimer's technical opinion, as noted above, was both right and wrong. Right, in that the 1949 H-bomb notion has not been made into a bomb and probably cannot be; wrong in that Teller later came up with another idea for a different product, which could be made.

Other students of today's state of affairs are unable to share the dogmatic and doubtless comforting certainty that Murray enjoys about the wrongness of Oppenheimer's political reasons.

A Turning Point

HERE, from the transcript, is Bush, referring to failure to use the prospect of a successful American superbomb as a basis for another attempt at negotiating with Russia. He is speaking of a second chance we might have had, just before the Eniwetok test:

"The test marked our entry into a very disagreeable type of world . . .

"I still think that we made a grave error in conducting that test at that time, and not attempting to make that type of simple agreement with Russia. I think history will show that was a turning point that when we entered into the grim world that we are now entering right now, that those who pushed that thing through to a conclusion without making that attempt have a great deal to answer for."

And here is the testimony of former Ambassador George F. Kennan:

"It seemed to me at the end of this atomic weapons race, if you pursued it to the end—we building all we can build, they building all they can build—stands the dilemma which is the mutually destructive quality of these weapons, and it was very dangerous for us to get our public before the dilemma, that the public mind will not entertain the dilemma, and people will take refuge in irrational and unsuitable ideas as to what to do . . ."

Our Terrible Ability

GRAY asked him how he could make a distinction between the fact that he favored building A-bombs but opposed making the H-bomb in 1949. Kennan replied:

"It is because of the wonder on my part as to whether we did not already have enough of this sort of terrible ability to commit destruction . . . What has worried me, Mr. Chairman, about going ahead with this is that we would come to think of our security as embraced solely in the mathematics of whatever power of destruction we could evolve, and we would forget our security lies still very largely in our ability to address ourselves to the positive and constructive problems of world affairs, to create confidence in other people."

"I am convinced that the best way to keep our allies around us is not to pay outwardly too much attention to the atomic weapons and to the prospect of war, but to come forward ourselves with plans that envisage the constructive and peaceful progress of humanity . . ."

"I have feared that if we get launched on a program that says the only thing we are concerned to do in the development of atomic weapons is to get as much as possible as rapidly as possible, that the attentions of the public and the Government will become riveted to that task at the expense of our ability to conduct ourselves profitably in positive aspects of foreign policy."

Oppenheimer was "convicted" by Gray and Morgan and by the four-man AEC majority primarily on the grounds of his association and dealings with Haakon Chevalier, a professor of French at the University of California, at Berkeley.

Chevalier appears as an energetic parlor pink, to say the least, if not a member of the Communist Party. He was one of Oppenheimer's many Communist-tinged friends at a time when Oppenheimer himself was Red as a beet.

Here is the body of facts on which the transcript shows little or no disagreement:

In late 1942 or more probably early 1943, when Oppenheimer was doing secret work in Berkeley but before he went to Los Alamos, Chevalier made a startling observation to Oppenheimer. The scene was the pantry or kitchen of Oppenheimer's home.

Chevalier declared that a man named George Eltenton, a British scientist working in the Shell Development Co., had spoken to him about the possibility of transmitting technical information to Soviet scientists. This was a period when Russia was our "gallant ally" and when many people resented national policy which excluded Russia from a free and steady flow of knowledge of our secrets.

Oppenheimer replied to Chevalier in strong terms, saying he thought this was terribly wrong. The subject was dropped, immediately and finally.

Cock and Bull Yarn

SOME MONTHS LATER, in the summer of 1943, by which time Oppenheimer had gone to Los Alamos, Col. John Lansdale, Jr., an attorney from a distinguished Cleveland law firm who had become chief intelligence officer of the Manhattan District, told Oppenheimer of a worry about security in Berkeley. Lansdale's concern had to do with activities of an organization in which, Oppenheimer knew, Eltenton was a member.

Shortly thereafter, on a return trip to Berkeley, Oppenheimer volunteered to the chief counter-intelligence officer of the San Francisco area that Eltenton would bear watching. He was pressed to say why.

At this point, in order not to involve his friend Chevalier and, admittedly, partly because he was reluctant to involve himself, Oppenheimer told the security officer, Col. Boris T. Pash, a "cock and bull story." He said Eltenton had made two or three approaches to Berkeley people to get information for the Russians. He declined to give the names of those involved.

Oppenheimer later confessed he was an "idiot" to make up the story; his shame and contrition for the lie haunt the transcript.

Some time later Colonel Lansdale and General Groves pressed Oppenheimer for the whole story. Groves, apparently in no great hurry or dither, did not force Oppenheimer to come clean until December, 1943. At that time Oppen-

heimer named Chevalier as the man Eltenton approached.

Even after this, intelligence officers still labored under the assumption that there had been three contacts. It is by no means clear, however, that Oppenheimer failed to tell Groves there was only one. Conclusive evidence one way or the other is lacking.

Dinner in Paris

AFTER THE WAR, Chevalier visited Oppenheimer for a couple of days at Princeton. Then, in December, 1953, after President Eisenhower had ordered the "blank wall" erected against Oppenheimer—although Oppenheimer did not yet know it—he saw Chevalier again. He and Mrs. Oppenheimer were in Paris, where Chevalier was then living. Mrs. Oppenheimer phoned Chevalier and the three had dinner together.

Next day, they went together to lunch with Andre Malraux. A one-time Communist, Malraux has become a violent anti-Communist and served as the philosophical apologist and confidant of the fiercely anti-Soviet General De Gaulle. Chevalier was working with Malraux on translations.

Friends and foes of Oppenheimer agree that his temporary concealment of what was pretty clearly attempted espionage and his outright lie were inexcusable. But they differ deeply over the implications.

In a pounding and protracted cross-examination, Roger Robb, special counsel for the Board, made Oppenheimer admit some 13 times that he had told a lie about the story; finally he made Oppenheimer say he had told a "tissue of lies." The fact was, he told one lie.

Crucial Evidence

THE AEC majority report denounced Oppenheimer for this matter in the bitterest and most violent terms. Between the lines of Commissioner Murray's separate opinion seems to be a rage that Oppenheimer visited Chevalier in Paris. A responsible newspaperman has reported that one AEC member said the case against Oppenheimer hinged on this point, and that the Commission felt that by his visit Oppenheimer risked being kidnapped by Russian agents.

One security officer at Los Alamos, Capt. (later Major) Peer de Silva, built up for his and his superior officers' edification in 1943 an elaborate argument to demonstrate that Oppenheimer, in volunteering the information about Eltenton, was playing an intricate game as a Soviet agent, to throw the bloodhounds off the track.

It is interesting to note, however, developments two years later, by which time De Silva had come to know Oppenheimer well. He wrote Oppenheimer the warmest sort of good-by letter, thanking him for "support and encouragement" and saying that Oppenheimer "contributed much to whatever success my office (the security office) has had in performing its mission."

Colonel Pash, who never had dealings with Oppenheimer in any degree after the one interview about the Chevalier affair, stuck to his doubts. In his testimony he indicated that he still questioned Oppenheimer's loyalty.

Moreover, he suggested that he believed Oppenheimer was lying in the hearings when he swore that he knew of only one contact by Eltenton, i. e. the approach by Chevalier to Oppenheimer. The first story Oppenheimer told, that there were three contacts, was more damaging to Oppenheimer if true, Pash argued. Therefore, by his logic, Oppenheimer was now faking a less damaging story.

The AEC majority picked this line of argument in its findings. "It is not clear today," Commissioners Strauss, Eugene M. Zuckert and Joseph Campbell wrote, "whether the account Dr. Oppenheimer gave to Colonel Pash in 1943 concerning the Chevalier incident or the story he told the Gray Board last month is the true version."

From this, the commissioners went on elsewhere in their report to question Oppenheimer's veracity.

On this point, however, it is interesting to note that the most diligent investigation of Colonel Pash and others never discovered that there were three contacts or even two. There was, as far as is known, only one—the one which Oppenheimer himself first revealed to Groves in 1943.

Lansdale Changed His Mind

THE testimony of Groves and his top intelligence officer, Lansdale, put a different light on the affair. Both vouched for Oppenheimer's loyalty.

Lansdale admitted that at first he was inclined to Pash's view and distrusted Oppenheimer deeply. But he emphasized to the Gray Board that it was Oppenheimer who took the initiative to tell, rather than hide, the Eltenton attempt. He said he believed Oppenheimer never lied about any other incident.

Groves' testimony made clear he felt it was very wrong of Oppenheimer to delay in telling the story, to refuse at first to name Chevalier and to lie about the incident. But he indicated that the important fact was that Oppenheimer had done the essential thing in disclosing the source of the danger to security. Regardless of whether there were three contacts or only one, "I felt I had gotten what I needed to get out of that."

Oppenheimer's own story, whether right or wrong, has been consistent since 1943 when he was questioned by the FBI. It remained so under all of Robb's cross-examination.

It was that he felt Chevalier was ignorant of what Ellenton was really trying to get him to do, and was in fact innocent of wrong intent. Accordingly, Oppenheimer tried to avoid implicating him in his interview with Pash and tried to protect him even later in not revealing his name to Lansdale or Groves until the bitter end.

Moreover, still feeling that Chevalier was innocent, he saw no reason why he should not have visited him in Paris last year. "I still think of Chevalier as a friend," said Oppenheimer.

Unused to Snitching

IN HIS dissenting opinion, AEC member Henry D. Smyth remarks that "if one starts with the assumption that Oppenheimer is disloyal," the incidents brought up in the hearings may arouse suspicion.

One could also start with the assumption that Oppenheimer was not disloyal, and come out with a perfectly logical picture of the Chevalier affair. For someone deeply immersed in the Communist movement, the process of coming out of it is not easy. In going to Pash with the news of Ellenton's espionage attempts, Oppenheimer was confronted with the prospect of having to snitch on a friend for the first time.

He made a botch of the job. One might guess that he was so naive that he thought the mere mentioning of Ellenton would be enough. Surprised that he was asked for more information, he began to improvise. It was a bad improvisation.

In describing Oppenheimer's attempt to conceal Chevalier's involvement, General Groves said he thought Oppenheimer was acting in "the typical American schoolboy attitude that there is something wicked about telling on a friend."

He went on: "I do know this: That he was doing what he thought was essential, which was to disclose to me the dangers of this particular attempt (of a potential spy) to enter the project."

Here is George Kennan, in somewhat subtler language, on the same point: "I also think it quite possible for a person to be himself profoundly honest and yet to have associates and friends who may be misguided and misled and for whom either at the time or in retrospect he may feel intensely sorry and concerned. I think most of us have had the experience of having known people at one time in our lives of whom we felt that way."

Kennan again, on Oppenheimer's later association with and visit to Chevalier: "I don't like to think that people in senior capacity in Government should not be permitted or conceded maturity of judgment to know when they can see such a person or when they can't. . . I would always like to have felt that my superiors in Government had enough confidence in me to let me handle the problem according to my own best conscience."

Cleared by AEC in '47

CONCEPT for the 1950 and 1953 visits with Chevalier and for some unclear data connected with the "nit-picking" incidents, almost all of the significant derogatory information against Oppenheimer that was introduced at the hearing had been brought to the attention of the AEC in 1947. The five members took pains to study the data with great thoroughness. They got opinions from Groves, Secretary of War Patterson, Bush and famed scientist James B. Conant. All were favorable to Oppenheimer.

The AEC cleared Oppenheimer in August, 1947. One member who cleared him, Strauss, now the AEC chairman, was and is president of the Institute for Advanced Studies. He was responsible for Oppenheimer's appointment as director of that distinguished academy two months later, in October, 1947.

In the Gray Board hearings, five former members of the AEC testified in his behalf, including the two previous chairmen, David Lilienthal and Gordon Dean. So did 10 former and present members of the General Advisory Committee, including the present chairman, Rabi. So did Norris Bradbury, Oppenheimer's successor as head of Los Alamos.

Gen. Frederick Osborn told how much tougher Oppenheimer had been in his outlook toward the Russians than Osborn was himself during the futile negotiations for international atomic control. Rabi even testified—he confessed to being surprised at it—to something he said he had seen in recent years, "a certain tendency of Dr. Oppenheimer to be inclined toward a preventive war," not that he went all the way, "but talking and thinking about it quite seriously."

The two outstanding public leaders of American science, Bush and Conant, appeared for him. So did John J. McCloy, in effect the civilian head of the Manhattan Project. Lansdale testified to his security, then and now. Groves vouched for his loyalty and said he had never had reason to regret clearing him for the top post in the A-bomb work (although he conceded he would probably not clear him under the standards of the AEC regulations).

Lansdale and Groves were the two men who had studied the security problem raised by Oppenheimer during the war years with the greatest intensity and who had the greatest responsibility in the matter.

No Hint of a Leak

SAVE for Pash and Borden, no one alleged that Oppenheimer was disloyal. There was not one assertion, even by Pash, that at any time Oppenheimer was indiscreet. Oppenheimer has been under the most intense surveillance for 11 years, his phones tapped, his movements watched, his mail observed. There was no evidence or charge that he had spilled even a semi-secret.

He was found guilty by the AEC majority of disturbing associations, continuing too long. The record shows his associations with dubious types after he

left Los Alamos in 1945 were surprisingly frequent—one had to search to find them. The record shows that his constant and close associates were scientists and statesmen, the ones who came to testify for him.

There have been persons who were far more deeply involved in the Communist conspiracy, as agents, spies and traitors, than Oppenheimer. By acts of contrition and confession, they have won back the favor of many Americans who consider that they have expiated their sins and are now fit to serve and advise their Government.

The hearings went deeply into the question of whether this might not also be possible and proper for Oppenheimer. Witness after witness testified to the probity of his actions since his lie in 1943, and particularly to the enormous contribution he made to his country. If the AEC majority was not impressed, the Gray Board was. The Nation owes Oppenheimer in particular, it wrote, "a great debt of gratitude for loyal and magnificent service."

Dr. Rabi perhaps put it best: "We had an A-bomb and a whole series of it . . . and what more do you want, mermaids?"

"This is just a tremendous achievement. If the end of the road is this kind of hearing, which can't help but be humiliating, I thought it was a pretty bad show. I still think so."

The transcript, as tense as it is thick, shows vividly who some of Oppenheimer's enemies were, and why they were out to topple him.

There was Borden, with a wild-eyed conviction which led him to write unprovable impossibilities which were to be precisely that abused word—credible.

There was Teller, shown as a disputatious fellow, removed from war work at Los Alamos during the war, mortally offended because his baby, the thermonuclear weapon, had not been blessed by Oppenheimer. Even he, however, did not question Oppenheimer's loyalty or security—only his judgment.

There were the scientists closely connected with the work at Berkeley. In the background, the record hints that the great E. O. Lawrence was misled. Others—Alvarez, Griggs, W. M. Latimer, Kenneth Pitzer—may have felt that Oppenheimer grew too big for his britches after he left them back in 1943.

And throughout, as mentioned before, there were those in the Air Force, powerful figures, who loathed his ideas and feared his effectiveness in plugging them.

Phenomena Unexplained

All of these forces taken together, however, do not account for some of the startling phenomena that are part of the Oppenheimer case. The record shows they existed; it does not explain why or how. It raises the questions but does not answer them.

Why, for example, was the huge transcript released at all, and suddenly, on a few hours' notice to Oppenheimer's lawyers? Gordon Gray had promised that the AEC would not take the initiative in making it public, yet the AEC did, after the Gray Report appeared but before the decision of the AEC itself.

For months, wild horses—more explicitly, the press and public—had failed to drag out of the AEC even meager details about our atomic affairs. Suddenly the transcript, an Operation Candor a dozen times more detailed than anyone dreamed of getting, was made public, with a staggering amount of information on thermonucleonics.

Why was there the savagery of language by the four AEC members who condemned Oppenheimer, the bitterness of phrase, the violence of denunciation? The Gray Report at least acknowledged Oppenheimer's loyalty and discretion and praised his gigantic contribution to his country. It expressed regret for the recommendation it found necessary. The majority AEC finding threw the man no crumb. It even left open the question of loyalty despite 900 conclusive pages about it.

Why was the hearing not an inquiry, according to the explicit rules of the AEC, but a trial, which the rules forbid? After the second day's testimony, it is clear to the reader of the transcript that Robb is a relentless prosecutor, out to get Oppenheimer, out to get into the record evidence that will destroy and degrade him.

Oppenheimer found himself in the worst of two possible worlds. An administrative inquiry would have lacked the adversary nature of a trial; a trial would have assured him and his witnesses and his counsel access to the documents used by the prosecution. Instead, Oppenheimer was repeatedly trapped by being called on to recount a conversation in 1943 or 1946 and, when he had finished, being confronted with a transcript of what he said then.

One little passage gives a flavor of the even-handedness of the Board's special counsel's examination. Attorney Robb is questioning the great physicist Hans Bethe, closely connected with the work of the AEC and against whom no question of loyalty or security has been raised. Bethe had testified strongly in Oppenheimer's behalf.

"Q. Doctor, how many divisions were there at Los Alamos?"

"A. It changed somewhat in the course of time. As far as I could count the other day, there were seven, but there may have been eight or nine at some time."

"Q. Which division was Klaus Fuchs in?"

"A. He was in my division, which was the Theoretical Division."

"Q. Thank you. That is all."

Protection or Punishment?

THERE is another, much deeper, question raised by the record and the decisions. It has to do with the nature and purpose of the security program. Is it meant to be preventive or punitive, protective or retaliatory?

In the light of a record of discretion and loyalty since 1943, did those who found against Oppenheimer remove his access to security documents because they were really afraid he might disclose secrets in the future, either by design or by accident?

And if they were really afraid, did their ruling solve the problem? Oppenheimer still has perhaps as much security information in his head as any man alive. Is he safe, running loose at Princeton?

Or did those who ruled against him do so because they felt he should be punished?

Were Oppenheimer's well scrutinized actions for more than a decade being examined for what presumptive indications they could give on what his acts would be from now on? Or were his associations for the decade preceding 1943 being examined to determine what retribution they merited?

From 'Oppie's' Book

BY one of those ironic coincidences that history now and then turns up, a little book written by Oppenheimer himself was published on the same day the transcript was released, and offered for sale at the same price.

It is a collection of the six Reith lectures Oppenheimer delivered in 1953 over the British Broadcasting System, telling the story of the new physics of the last 30 or 40 years. It is the story of the monumental "breakthrough" of discovery and understanding that succeeded Newton's picture of the world. It is a discussion of the field of knowledge, from sub-atomic particle to cosmos, which is so intimately associated with Oppenheimer and to which he has so richly contributed.

The book, "Science and the Common Understanding," is technically difficult and for the most part hard going. But there are flashes in it that tell much about the man who wrote it, and his outlook. There is a quotation in it that may serve as a final word. It is from a letter written by a great man to a young friend:

"Science can never be retrograde; what is once acquired of real knowledge can never be lost. To preserve the freedom of the human mind then and freedom of the press, every spirit should be ready to devote himself to martyrdom; for as long as we may think as we will, and speak as we think, the condition of man will proceed in improvement."

"The generation which is bowing off the stage has deserved well of mankind for the struggles it has made, and for having arrested that course of despotism which had overwhelmed the world for thousands and thousands of years. If there seems to be danger that the group that have gained will be lost again, that danger comes from the generation your contemporary."

But that the enthusiasm which characterizes youth should lift its parricide hands against freedom and science would be such a monstrous phenomenon as I cannot place among possible things in this age and country."


Oppenheimer was quoting from a letter by Thomas Jefferson.



Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, towering figure of American science, is the protagonist in the drama which emerges from the 993 pages of transcript.



Leading defenders of Dr. Oppenheimer, as shown by the transcript, included Dr. Vannevar Bush (left), Grand Old Man of American science, and former Ambassador George F. Kennan (right).



Detractors of Dr. Oppenheimer included the brilliant but difficult Dr. Edward Teller (left) and William L. Borden (right), former executive director of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy.



Members of the special Personnel Security Board which heard the testimony contained in the transcript. Left to right, Dr. Ward F. Evans, professor of chemistry at

Loyola University, Chicago (who voted for Oppenheimer); Gordon Gray, former Secretary of the Army and Thomas A. Morgan, president of the Sperry Corp.



Gen. Leslie R. Groves, former head of the Manhattan Project, plays a Falstaffian role in some of the testimony before the Gray Board.



Dr. I. I. Rabi, a "member" of "ZORC," told the board: "We have an A-bomb . . . and what more do you want—mermaids?"



Roger Robb, special counsel to the Gray Board, was a relentless prosecutor of Dr. Oppenheimer, dogged in his cross-examination.



David Lilienthal, former AEC chairman, was one of the school which opposed the policy of "massive retaliation" proposed after the Russians exploded their first A-bomb in 1949.



John J. McCloy, who as Assistant Secretary of War was, in effect, civilian head of the Manhattan Project, which fashioned the A-bomb, was a witness for Oppenheimer.



Dr. Luis Alvarez was one of the Berkeley (University of California) group of scientists which pressed for a "crash program" to build the H-bomb while Oppenheimer was opposing it.



Dr. James B. Conant, one of the top outstanding leaders of American science, testified for Oppenheimer, as did the other, Dr. Bush.



The Atomic Energy Commission, which voted 4-to-1 to deny Dr. Oppenheimer's appeal to lift his suspension from access to security information. Left to right:

Thomas E. Murray, Henry D. Smyth (who voted for Oppenheimer), Eugene M. Zuckert and Chairman Lewis L. Strauss.

FILE DESCRIPTION

BUREAU FILE

J. ROBERT

SUBJECT OPPENHEIMER

FILE NO. 100-17828-A

SECTION NO. 13

SERIALS A-1

THROUGH

A-100

VOLUME Sec. 13

HEADQUARTERS FILES

REVIEWED BY lbn/SJSFile No: 100-17828-ARe: J. Robert OppenheimerDate: 2/78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
1	3/7/55	CLIPPING FROM Seattle Times	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
2	3/7/55	CLIPPING FROM SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
3	3/8/55	" WASH. STAR	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
4	3/10/55	" WASH. CITY NEWS SERVICE	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
5	3/14/55	" WASH. NEWS	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
6	3/19/55	" CT DAILY NEWS	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
7	3/20/55	" N.Y. POST	2	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
8	3/21/55	" N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE	2	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
9	3/23/55	" SEATTLE TIMES	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
10	3/28/55	" "	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
11	3/23/55	" N.Y. WORLD TELEGRAM & SUN	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
12	3/24/55	" N.Y. TIMES	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME

File No: 100-17828-ARe: J. Robert OppenheimerDate: 2/78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
13	3/24/55	CLIPPING FROM THE N.Y. POST	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
14	3/24/55	" SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER	2	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
15	3/24/55	" N.Y. POST	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
16	3/24/55	" SEATTLE TIMES	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
17	3/24/55	" NY JOURNAL AMERICAN	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
18	3/24/55	" WASH. STAR	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
19	3/24/55	" WASH. CITY NEWS SERVICE	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
20	3/25/55	" Seattle Post Intelligencer	3	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
21	3/25/55	" "	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
22	3/25/55	CLIPPING FROM THE WASH. POST & TIMES HERALD	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
23	3/25/55	" "	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
24	3/27/55	" "	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME

VOLUME Sec. 13

HEADQUARTERS FILES

REVIEWED BY 46n/STSFile No: 100-17828-ARe: J. Robert OppenheimerDate: 2/78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
25	4/18/55	CLIPPING FROM THE STAR LEDGER	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
26	4/4/55	" SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCE	3	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
27	3/29/55	" SEATTLE TIMES	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
28	4/1/55	" SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCE	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
29	4/1/55	" US NEWS & WORLD REPORT	4	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
30	4/6/55	" SEATTLE TIMES	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
31	4/7/55	" SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCE	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
32	4/9/55	" BS DAILY GLOBE	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
33	4/8/55	" SEATTLE TIMES	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
34	4/11/55	" OREGONIAN	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
35	5/2/55	" SF CHRONICLE	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
36	7/55	" FACTS FORUM NEWS	9	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME

Sec 13
VOLUME

HEADQUARTERS FILES

REVIEWED BY Hon /STSFile No: 100-17828-A Re: J. Robert OppenheimerDate: 2/78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
37	4/14/55	COPY FROM THE N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
38	4/25/55	" EUGENE REGISTAR GUARD	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
39	5/1/55	" WASH. POST & TIMES HERALD	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
40	5/8/55	" "	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
41	5/17/55	" WASH CITY NEWS SERVICE	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
42	5/25/55	" "	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
43	5/27/55	" N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
44	5/19/55	" WASH STAR	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
45	5/55	" FACTS FORUM NEWS	7	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
46	8/28/55	" The Sunday Star	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
47	8/29/55	" WASH STAR	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
48	9/5/55	" SF CHRONICLE	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME

File No: 100-17828-A Re: J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMERDate: 2/78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
49	10/31/55	COPY FROM THE BOSTON TRAVELER	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
50	11/15/55	" JERSEY JOURNAL	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
51	1/27/56	" SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER	2	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
52	2/3/56	" WASH POST & TIME HERALD	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
53	3/8/56	" MANCHESTER UNION LEADER	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
54	3/27/56	" WASH. CITY NEWS SERVICE	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
55	4/12/56	" NEWARK EVENING NEWS	2	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
56	4/12/56	" NK STAR LEDGER	2	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
57	5/10/56	" JOURNAL-AMERICAN	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
58	5/11/56	" N.Y. HERALD	2	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
59	5/15/56	" Ct. SUN-TIMES	2	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
60	5/16/56	" KING SYNDICATE INC.	3	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME

File No: 100-17828-ARe: J. Robert OppenheimerDate: 2/78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
61	12/29/56	CLIPPING FROM NEWSWEEK	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
62	4/5/57	" " " " " " WASH. POST & TIMES HERALD	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
63	4/5/57	" " " " " " N.Y. JOURNAL-AMERICAN	2	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
64	4/9/57	" " " " " " WASH. POST & TIMES HERALD	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
65	4/10/57	" " " " " " N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
66	4/15/57	" " " " " " N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
67	6/28/57	LETTER FROM ANOTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
68	7/7/57	CLIPPING FROM Champaign-Urbana Courier	2	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
69	10/30/57	KING FEATURE SYNDICATE	2	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
70	11/4/57	CLIPPING FROM WASH. STAR	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
71	11/5/57	" " " " " " WASH. POST & TIMES HERALD	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
72	11/5/57	" " " " " " WASH. NEWS	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME

File No: 100-17828-ARe: J. ROBERT OPENHEIMERDate: 2/78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
73	11/8/57	CLIPPING FROM WASH. POST AND TIMES HERALD	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
74	11/8/57	" " VIRGINIAN PILOT	2	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
75	11/17/57	" " WASH. CITY NEWS SERVICE	3	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
76	11/18/57	" " WASH. POST AND TIMES HERALD	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
77	11/21/57	" " WASH. STAR	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
78	11/18/57	" " WASH. STAR	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
79	11/19/57	" " EVENING NEWS	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
80	11/22/57	" " WASH. CITY NEWS SERVICE	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
81	11/22/57	" " " "	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
82	11/22/57	" " N.Y. TIMES	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
83	12/1/57	" " N.Y. TIMES	2	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
84	12/2/57	" " N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME

File No: 100-17828-ARe: J. Robert Oppenheimer

Date:

2/78

(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
85	12/4/57	CLIPPING FROM N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
86	12/8/57	" WASH. CITY NEWS SERVICE	2	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
87	12/9/57	" N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
88	12/9/57	" N.Y. DAILY NEWS	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
89	12/9/57	" NY NEWS	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
90	12/9/57	" N.Y. WORLD TELEGRAM & SUN	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
91	12/23/57	" N.Y. TIMES	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
92	12/24/57	" WASH. POST & TIMES HERALD	2	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
93	12/24/57	" " "	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
94	1/9/58	" " "	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
95	1/9/58	" NY DAILY NEWS	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME
96	1/8/58	" WASH. CITY NEWS SERVICE	1	-	OUTSIDE TIME FRAME

File No: 100-17828-A

Re: J. Robert Oppenheimer

Date: 2/78
(month/year)

[illegible]

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100
17828-A

SECTION 13
MARCH 7, 1955-MARCH 14, 1958

FILE DESCRIPTION

BUREAU FILE

SUBJECT J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER

FILE NO. 100-17828 SUB A

SECTION NO. 14

SERIALS A-1

THRU

A-51

File No: 100-17828 subf

Re: JULIUS ROBERT OPPENHEIMER

Date: 2-28 (month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
1	3-15-58	WASH POST AND TIMES HERALD NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS	1	0	OUTSIDE THE ROSENBERG CASE
2	3-15-58	WASH. NEWS NEWS CLIP	1	0	" " " "
3	3-15-58	WASH POST & TIMES HERALD NEWS CLIP	1	0	" " " "
4	3-31-58	WASH POST & TIMES HERALD NEWS CLIP	1	0	" " " "
5	4-1-58	ENVELOPE WITH 5 ENDS FROM LOOK MAGAZINE	6	0	OUTSIDE THE ROSENBERG CASE
6	4-16-58	WASH. POST AND TIMES HERALD NEWS CLIPS	2	0	" " " "
7	4-16-58	WASH POST AND TIMES HERALD NEWS CLIP	1	0	" " " "
8	4-17-58	N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE NEWS CLIPS	2	0	" " " "
9	4-17-58	WASH STAR NEWS CLIP	1	0	OUTSIDE THE ROSENBERG CASE
10	4-18-58	WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE NEWS CLIP	1	0	" " " "
11	4-20-58	WASH STAR NEWS CLIP	1	0	" " " "
12	4-20-58	WASH STAR NEWS CLIP	1	0	" " " "

File No: 100-13129 sub ARe: VILLIUS ROBERT OPPENHEIMERDate 2-78
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
25	6-11-61	WASH POST TIMES HERALD NEWSCLIP	1	0	outside the Rosenberg Case
26	2-12-61	MIAMI NEWS NEWSCLIP	1	0	" " "
27	7-24-61	INDIANAPOLIS STAR NEWSCLIP	2	0	" " "
28	4-10-62	WASH CAP NEWS SERVICE NEWSCLIP	1	0	" " "
29	4-9-63	"	1	0	outside the Rosenberg Case
30	4-12-63	"	1	0	" " "
31	4-11-63	Press Release	2	0	" " "
32	4-9-63	WASH POST TIMES HERALD NEWSCLIP	1	0	" " "
33	4-18-63	Record American (Boston) NEWSCLIP	1	0	outside the Rosenberg Case
34	7-8-63	Press Release	2	0	" " "
35	12-3-63	WASH CAP NEWS SERVICE NEWSCLIP	1	0	" " "
36	12-6-63	"	2	0	" " "

File No: 100-9626 SUBARe: JULIUS ROBERT ROSENBERGDate: 2-28
(month/year)

Serial	Date	Description (Type of communication, to, from)	No. of Pages		Exemptions used or, to whom referred (Identify statute if (b)(3) cited)
			Actual	Released	
37	12-28-65	PEOPLE'S WORLD NEWSCLIP	2	0	outside the Rosenberg Case
38	1-25-67	WASH POST/TIMES HERALD NEWSCLIP	1	0	" " "
39	2-20-67	WASH POST & TIMES HERALD NEWSCLIP	2	0	" " "
40	2-23-67	WASH CAP NEWS SERVICE NEWSCLIP	1	0	" " "
41	2-19-67	SUNDAY STAR (WASH) NEWSCLIP	2	0	outside the Rosenberg Case
42	2-20-67	WASH. POST TIMES HERALD NEWSCLIP	4	0	" " "
43	2-22-67	WASH POST Times Herald Newsclip	2	0	" " "
44	6-27-68	Village Voice Newsclip (orig & 3 copies)	16	0	" " "
45	3-8-69	NY TIMES news clip	2	0	outside the Rosenberg Case
46	11-3-69	NY TIMES news clip	1	0	" " "
47	1-4-70	NY TIMES (Book Review).	5	0	" " "
48	2-2-70	WASH POST Times Herald Newsclip	2	0	" " "

Re: Julius Robert OPPENHEIMER

Date: 2-28
(month/year)

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